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Something Stinks: The Need for
Stronger Agricultural Waste
Regulations
Audrey Curelop*
Abstract
In the twentieth century, the American agricultural industry
underwent significant changes—while most food animals were
once raised on small family farms, now, over fifty percent are
produced entirely inside concentrated animal feeding operations.
These large‑scale farming operations house hundreds to
thousands of cows, swine, or chickens, which collectively produce
hundreds of millions of tons of waste per year. The primary
method of waste disposal is land application, a process in which
waste is sprayed or spread onto land with no required
pretreatment. After land application, waste byproducts make
their way into the surrounding air and waterways, posing
significant threats to human health and the environment.
This Note challenges this industry‑accepted method of waste
disposal. It argues that federal environmental and regulatory
law and state nuisance law coincide to effectively protect
large‑scale agricultural facilities from liability at a detriment to
American health. This Note examines liability carve-outs for
industrial farming in three federal statutory schemes: the Clean
Water Act, the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, and the
* J.D. Candidate, Class of 2023, Washington and Lee University School
of Law; Bachelor of Arts in English and Media Communications, Class of 2018,
University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. Thank you, Professor Jill Fraley,
for your guidance and insight through the writing process. Thank you to my
writing buddy, Jessica Matsuda, for keeping me mostly sane. Thank you to my
family and to my love, Alex Gregory—I am incredibly grateful for your
constant support.
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Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and
Liability Act. When federal environmental protections fail,
affected parties often turn to common law tort redress. But state
Right‑to‑Farm laws have effectively barred these claims as well.
Although the products of industrial agriculture are enjoyed
by the many, the environmental and health impacts of the farms’
waste disposal systems fall on the few. This Note additionally
seeks to highlight the communities most affected—primarily,
low‑income communities and communities of color that neighbor
the farming operations.
The most comprehensive solution to this health crisis
involves an ideological shift in the way the American public
conceptualizes the farm-to-table pipeline. This Note ultimately
argues that this shift requires a catalyst—a robust federal
initiative that disincentivizes hazardous agricultural waste
practices and incentives sustainable farming.
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Anyone with a pet knows firsthand that raising animals means
dealing with animal waste. But many of us may not realize that
as the waste breaks down, it emits serious pollutants—most
notably ammonia and hydrogen sulfide. While those emissions
are miniscule for pet owners, they can be quite substantial for
farms that have hundreds or thousands of animals.
Judge Stephen Fain Williams1
INTRODUCTION
Industrial farming creates waste that is dangerous to
human health and the environment, but regulatory laws that
adequately remedy this issue are nonexistent. Because federal
and state regulation of agricultural waste is minimal, industrial
farms are allowed to manage waste in a way that negatively
impacts the environment and health of rural communities,
particularly low-income and minority communities. Where
environmental regulations fail to provide adequate remedies,
communities often rely on common law tort claims as a means
for limited redress. In the case of agricultural waste, however,
Right-to-Farm laws and other state legal protections for farmers
remove the fail-safe of tort liability. As a result, agricultural
waste goes largely unchecked and those affected by it are left
without a remedy. Due to the particularly politicized nature of
state farming legislation, this problem can only be fixed with a
strong federal initiative. This initiative must commence with a
1.

Waterkeeper All. v. EPA, 853 F.3d 527, 529 (D.C. Cir. 2017).
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robust federal statutory and regulatory scheme that
disincentivizes hazardous agricultural waste practices and
incentivizes sustainable farming. But the issue of
environmentally dangerous agricultural waste disposal requires
more than a legal solution—the ultimate remedy will only come
with a collective shift in the way the American people
conceptualize the farm-to-table pipeline.
This Note begins with an introduction to the history of
American agriculture and a discussion of current waste disposal
methods and their impacts on human health and the
environment.2 Next, this Note presents the regulatory
landscape surrounding agricultural waste with a particular
focus on the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA),3
the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation
and Liability Act (CERCLA),4 and the Clean Water Act (CWA).5
This Part also discusses the ways in which state regulations fail
to fill federal regulatory gaps.6 This Note then discusses
nuisance as a common law means of environmental activism,
how Right-to-Farm laws preclude this remedy, and McKiver v.
Murphy-Brown7—the nuisance case that recently spurred a
regeneration of state agricultural protections.8 The Note
concludes with three concrete solutions: (i) amend the CWA to
more broadly cover “concentrated animal feeding operation[s]”
as point sources; (ii) amend RCRA to specifically classify
“agricultural waste” as “hazardous;” and (iii) impose CERCLA
liability on agricultural facilities based on the new CWA and
RCRA definitions.9

2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

See infra Part I.
42 U.S.C. §§ 6901–6992.
42 U.S.C. §§ 9601–9675.
33 U.S.C. §§ 7401–7675; see infra Part II.A.
See infra Part II.B.
980 F.3d 937 (4th Cir. 2020).
See infra Part III.
See infra Part IV.
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ENVIRONMENTAL & SOCIAL IMPACT OF AGRICULTURAL
WASTE

Rosemary Partridge “love[s] hogs.”10 She grew up on a small
farm in Iowa where she and her family raised pigs, cattle, and
sheep, and grew crops.11 In fact, Rosemary still lives in Iowa,
where she and her husband continue to farm.12 But in the
“nearly 40 years” they have lived there, the neighborhood has
changed—the small farming community has become
commercial.13 Rosemary’s “land is now surrounded by hog
factories,” and the animal waste pollution “is almost
unbearable.”14 Unfortunately, Rosemary’s story is not
exceptional. While agriculture has always played a prominent
role in the American experience, the move from small to
industrial farming has drastically changed the effect of farming
on the American people, with one of the largest environmental
and health impacts resulting from agricultural waste
management.
This Part will first discuss the history of American
agriculture. Next, it will discuss the current best practices in
agricultural waste disposal and the negative health impacts
caused by improper management of agricultural waste. Lastly,
this Part will discuss the impact that waste disposal practices
have on surrounding communities.
A.

A Brief History of American Agriculture

Each state has a rich agricultural history, from egg and
poultry production in Alabama to rows of soybeans in Delaware
and hills of sweet potatoes in Louisiana.15 Across the United
States, however, farming has changed drastically in the last
10. Rosemary Partridge, My Nightmare Neighbors: 30,000 Hogs and
Their
(Secretly
Toxic)
Manure,
MEDIUM
(Dec.
15,
2016),
https://perma.cc/FM7L-9PM8.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. See Seth Berkman, How Farming Has Changed in Every State the
Last 100 Years, STACKER (Sept. 3, 2020), https://perma.cc/86N9-CRD2
(comparing data from the 1920 Agriculture Census to the 2019 Census State
Agriculture summaries).
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century.16 The agricultural operations of our past consisted
primarily of smaller and geographically widespread family
farms, but now “[m]ost dairy cows, chickens, pigs and turkeys in
the US are housed in high-density, confined spaces.”17
Additionally, while American farming has expanded and
increased in value since 1920, the number of farms has
dramatically decreased.18 For example, in the 1920s, Kentucky
was best known for horse and cattle ranching: the state housed
over 382,442 horses and over one million cattle across 270,626
farms.19 Over the past century, the number of farms in Kentucky
dropped to 75,100 (a 72.2% decrease from 1920), while cattle
inventory rose to 2.1 million and chicken production rose to over
303 million.20 Notably, the total farm acres in Kentucky in 2019
was 12.9 million, a 40.3% decrease from 1920.21 Scholars have
attributed this shift to the increased market demand for poultry
in the 1930s, which spurred a change from a seasonal
agricultural cycle to continuous production.22 At the time, “the
US army was the largest consumer of broiler chickens and,
following [World War II], the integrated model was increasingly
adopted by the industry.”23 Starting in the 1970s, other livestock
16. Jay P. Graham & Keeve E. Nachman, Managing Waste from Confined
Animal Feeding Operations in the United States: The Need for Sanitary
Reform, 8 J. WATER & HEALTH 646, 647 (2010).
17. Id.
18. See Berkman, supra note 15 (“[T]here were almost three times as
many farms 100 years ago than there are today—in 1920 there were 6.4
million farms, while 2020 estimates come in at two million.”).
19. Id.; see also USDA, 2017 CENSUS OF AGRICULTURE: UNITED STATES
SUMMARY AND STATE DATA 7–8 [hereinafter 2017 CENSUS] (detailing historical
highlight data of the United States’ agricultural censuses from 1987 to 2017).
Notably, while the number of farms in the United States has decreased over
the last ten years, the average size of farms and the average market value of
agricultural products sold per farm have increased. Id.
20. Berkman, supra note 15; see also U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, BUREAU
OF THE CENSUS, FOURTEENTH CENSUS OF THE UNITED STATES TAKEN IN THE YEAR
1920, AGRICULTURE, ch. X, tbl. 3 (1920) (reporting approximately ten million
chickens in Kentucky in 1920).
21. Berkman, supra note 15.
22. See Graham & Nachman, supra note 16, at 647 (attributing the
“industrial system of raising and processing large numbers of animals in
confinement” to the broiler poultry industry).
23. Id. The integrated model created a corporate relationship between
“companies that perform most of the production activities,” the integrators,
and farmers or growers contracted to “lease [livestock] from the integrator.”
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production industries began to adopt similar practices.24 Now,
“nearly half of all food animals are produced” in concentrated
animal feeding operations (CAFOs)—yet these operations
“occupy less than 5% of the land base used for animal
production.”25
B.

Common Agricultural Waste Disposal Methods

As agricultural operations evolved to house more animals
in increasingly condensed spaces, the amount of concentrated
animal waste produced soared.26 Farming operations were then
tasked with developing waste disposal systems to deal with the
new model of livestock production.27
Swine and cattle operations predominately adopted
“water-based slurry systems that essentially flush waste from
the floors where the animals are housed, and channel the liquid
slurry into large ponds for storage.”28 These ponds, or “lagoons,”
are not a permanent location for animal waste; instead, the
waste is later utilized.29 “Utilization includes reusing and/or
Id. This model allows integrators to “maintain strict controls over much of the
farmers’ activities” regarding raising, feeding, managing, and providing for
veterinary treatments of the leased animals. Id. While not the topic of this
Note, another significant drawback of this model is that it often takes
bargaining power away from the farmers, most of whom earn proportionally
low wages and must take on significant debt to buy into these investments.
See id. (“[N]early three-quarters of poultry farmers earn below poverty-level
wages and most farmers have significant debt from capital investments that
reduce their bargaining power with integrators.”).
24. See id. at 648 (“Swine production demonstrated a 574% increase in
the number raised in confinement in the US between 1982 and 1997.”).
25. Id. The Sierra Club defines “CAFO” as “an industrial-sized livestock
operation” that confines “anywhere from hundreds to millions of
animals . . . at least 45 days or more per year in an area without vegetation.”
Why Are CAFOs Bad?, SIERRA CLUB MICH. CHAPTER, https://perma.cc/RDK5S8LV; see also infra notes 161–165 and accompanying text.
26. See Graham & Nachman, supra note 16, at 649 (“According to the US
Department of Agriculture, confined food animals produce roughly 335 million
tons of waste . . . per year.”).
27. See, e.g., id., at 650 (attributing the need for current waste disposal
systems to “insufficient space available for each animal to freely excrete and
for natural systems to absorb and decompose these wastes”).
28. Id.
29. See, e.g., McKiver v. Murphy-Brown, LLC, 980 F.3d 937, 946 (4th Cir.
2020) (“Kinlaw Farms periodically drained waste from the lagoons and spread
it across open ‘sprayfields’”).
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recycling of waste products,” and methods of utilization vary
depending on the type of animal waste.30 Dairy and cattle waste
is often “used as bedding for livestock, marketed as compost, and
used as an energy source.”31 But the most common utilization
for both cattle and swine operations is “land application.”32 The
three common methods of land application include the use of
(i) “spreading devices” for solid waste; (ii) “irrigation systems”
for liquid or partially liquid waste; and (iii) soil injection, if
“odors are a problem.”33 Alternatively, swine and cattle farms
can dispose of solid waste mixed with bedding by applying it
directly to fields as fertilizer, but this is a less common method.34
In contrast, poultry waste is almost exclusively collected
and disposed of as solid waste.35 “Waste associated with poultry
operations includes manure and dead poultry,” and “can also
include litter, wash-flush water, and wasted feed.”36 There are
two types of standard poultry confinement facilities: those used
to house broilers and turkeys produced for meat, and those to
house layers.37 Generally, broilers are housed in large barns for
the time it takes to raise a flock, about five to seven weeks.38
During that time, manure is “allowed to accumulate on the floor

30. See USDA, AGRICULTURAL WASTE MANAGEMENT FIELD HANDBOOK 5,
14, 17, 18 (2011) [hereinafter WASTE MANAGEMENT HANDBOOK].
31. Id. at 14.
32. Id. at 14, 18.
33. Id. at 18.
34. See Animal Agriculture in the U.S.—Trends in Production and
Manure Management, LIVESTOCK & POULTRY ENV’T LEARNING CMTY. (Mar. 5,
2019), https://perma.cc/2PSW-WXDA (“In decades past, most farms handled
manure as a solid material, often mixed with bedding, and hauled the manure
and bedding out to a field regularly, referred to as ‘daily haul.’”).
35. See Layer Hen Housing and Manure Management, LPE LEARNING
CTR. [hereinafter Layer Management], https://perma.cc/8FR5-4CGJ (“Manure
from layer housing is predominantly handled as a solid or semi-solid that is
moist when excreted and then dries out, to varying degrees, during the manure
movement and storage process.”); Broiler Chicken Farms and Manure
Management, LPE LEARNING CTR. [hereinafter Broiler Management],
https://perma.cc/M7MT-6W22 (“Broiler litter is a solid manure and can be
collected and stored as such [and the] mixture of bedding and manure (litter)
makes broilers different than other major animal agriculture sectors.”).
36. WASTE MANAGEMENT HANDBOOK, supra note 30, at 25.
37. Id.
38. See Broiler Management, supra note 35 (“A typical broiler house will
have 20–30,000 birds and can raise 5–7 flocks per year.”).
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where it is mixed with litter” and “forms a ‘cake’ that is removed
between flocks.”39 Layer hens are usually housed in cages, which
are commonly organized in a “high-rise” system so that rows of
cages are placed on top of one another with manure belt systems
to remove waste between each row.40 “The belt below each cage
catches manure to prevent it from dropping on the birds below
and then carries [it] away for storage outside of the hen house.”41
In both systems, the removed waste is applied directly to the
land.42 The U.S. Department of Agriculture recommends that
owners who “do not have enough land suitable for
application . . . should arrange to apply the waste to their
neighbors’ land.”43
As discussed in greater detail below, the current
agricultural waste methods endanger the environment and
public health because byproducts in animal waste commonly
find their way into nearby water supplies or are sprayed into the
air.44
C.

Environmental & Public Health Impacts

Regardless of the original method of waste disposal, almost
all agricultural waste is ultimately utilized as fertilizer and
“applied to land without any required pretreatment.”45 In
comparison, human biosolids are treated to the point where they
“are assumed to be pathogen-free,” or by a “process [which]
significantly reduce[s] pathogens.”46 This is significant because
39. WASTE MANAGEMENT HANDBOOK, supra note 30, at 25.
40. Id.; see Layer Management, supra note 35 (“Manure belts can be used
with conventional cages, each containing around 8 birds and stacked one on
top of another.”).
41. Layer Management, supra note 35.
42. WASTE MANAGEMENT HANDBOOK, supra note 30, at 25.
43. Id. Because “[c]hicken manure is rich in nutrients like nitrogen,
phosphorus, and potassium, . . . [t]he vast majority of layer manure today is
sold to third parties.” Layer Management, supra note 35. But see Graham &
Nachman, supra note 16, at 652 (“The problems are exacerbated when
operations over-apply waste, a common practice among larger operations that
lack sufficient land for waste application.”).
44. See infra Part I.C.
45. Graham & Nachman, supra note 16, at 650. “For example, for poultry
litter, over 90% is applied to land.” Id.
46. Id. Biosolids that are assumed to be pathogen-free are classified as
Class A and can be applied to any land once the treatment process concludes.
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“pathogens in animal waste can be equal to or even higher than
levels found in human wastewater and sludge.”47 For example,
swine waste “can contain 28 times the density of [fecal]
streptococci found in human waste.”48 If we as a society
acknowledge that human waste needs to be treated before it is
disposed to prevent dangers to the environment and human
health, why not animal waste? After all, the EPA has
acknowledged that “confined livestock and poultry operations
generate three times as much raw waste as humans.”49
Scientific studies have confirmed that untreated animal
wastes applied to land can lead to toxicity in neighboring water
sources.50 Once applied to the land, byproducts of animal waste
make their way by means of runoff51 to both waterways and
groundwater.52 Prior to land application, storage in waste
lagoons can also pose risks to clean water due to leaks and
ruptures caused by poor management or weather.53 One study
found that concentrations of fecal coliforms in streams
neighboring swine CAFOs commonly “exceeded state and
federal recreational water quality guidelines,” suggesting
Id. Class B, biosolids that “have a [fecal] coliform count less than 2 x 106 per
gram or have been treated by a ‘process to significantly reduce pathogens,’”
can be applied only to “agricultural, forest and mine reclamation sites.” Id.
Any treated biosolids may not be applied to land unless approved by the EPA.
See id. (“[I]f biosolids do not meet these limits, they can still be approved by
the EPA for land amendment as long as they are accompanied by an
information sheet specifying maximum annual application rate.”).
47. Id.
48. Id. at 651.
49. Terence J. Centner, New Regulations to Minimize Water Impairment
from Animals Rely on Management Practices, 30 ENV’T INT’L 539, 539 (2004)
50. See, e.g., Christopher D. Heaney et al, Source Tracking Swine Fecal
Waste in Surface Water Proximal to Swine Concentrated Animal Feeding
Operations, 511 SCI. TOTAL ENV’T 676, 677 (2015) (finding that fecal coliforms,
E. coli, and Enterococcus [fecal indicator bacteria] sample concentrations
“exceeded state and federal recreational water quality guidelines” by 40, 23,
and 61%, respectively, both up- and downstream from North Carolina swine
CAFO lagoons).
51. See id. at 681 (tracking “swine-specific fecal waste runoff . . . proximal
to swine CAFO liquid waste land application sites”).
52. See Agricultural Contaminants, U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURV., U.S. DEP’T OF
THE INTERIOR (Mar. 1, 2019), https://perma.cc/KYB9-MZJV (“Agricultural
contaminants can impair the quality of surface water and groundwater.”).
53. See, e.g., Graham & Nachman, supra note 16, at 650 (documenting
spills in Iowa, Missouri, Nebraska, Ohio, Maryland, and New York).
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“diffuse and overall poor sanitary quality of surface waters
where swine CAFO density is high.”54 In addition to fecal
coliforms, pathogenic microorganisms, zoonotic protozoa,
antibiotic-resistant bacteria, and pharmaceuticals often inhabit
food animal waste.55
In terms of microbial pathogens, “Salmonella spp.,
Campylobacter spp., Listeria monocytogenes, Cryptosporidium
parvum, Giardia lamblia, [and] E. Coli . . . are the most
common causative agents of disease and outbreaks that most
likely originate from animal-feeding operations.”56 These are
especially worrisome because they can survive for extended
periods of time and are transported long distances in water.57
These bacteria have been found to travel both upstream and
downstream of CAFOs.58 Healthy people exposed to microbial
pathogens typically recover “after a bout of diarrhea, [but] more
vulnerable groups like infants, pregnant women, the elderly,
and those with weak immune systems are at risk of severe
illness and death.”59
Similarly, protozoa are microparasites found in animal
waste that “are of a particular concern . . . due to their high
prevalence and environmental stability.”60 “The ability of
[protozoa] to withstand chlorination and other disinfectants
increases the threat of disease.”61 Additionally, they commonly
and asymptomatically present themselves in animals,
particularly cattle, which excrete them with no sign of
infection.62 The most common protozoan found in cattle is
C. parvum, which is transmitted through contaminated food and

54. Id. at 676.
55. See id. at 652–54 (detailing the risks associated with byproducts of
food animal waste).
56. Id. at 652.
57. Id.
58. See Heaney et al., supra note 50, at 684 (noting that upstream
“locations did not represent pristine non-impacted sites” because fecal
indicator bacteria were still detected).
59. D. LEE MILLER & GREGORY MUREN, NAT. RES. DEF. COUNCIL, CAFOS:
WHAT WE DON’T KNOW IS HURTING US 8 (2019).
60. Graham & Nachman, supra note 16, at 652.
61. Id.
62. See id. (“Prevalence rates . . . range from 1.1 to 62.4% in apparently
healthy cattle and up to 79% in symptomatic calves.”).
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water, is currently untreatable in humans, and leads to diarrhea
and malnutrition.63
Excess pharmaceuticals in farm animal waste also pose a
risk to human health. Some of the more prevalent
pharmaceuticals found in agricultural waste are antibiotics.64
“Estimates of the amounts of antimicrobials used in US
food-animal production currently range from 3.1 million pounds
to approximately 25 million pounds annually . . . [and
antimicrobials] have been found in surface and groundwater
located near swine and poultry operations.”65 Farmers began
giving antibiotics to livestock “some 50 years ago” to “improv[e]
growth, feed efficiency and disease prevention.”66 One of the
most prevalent antimicrobial feed additives used in both poultry
and swine production is Roxarsone, which degrades to arsenite
and arsenate—leachable forms of arsenic—when excreted in
animal waste.67 This compound is known to cause cancer and
other dangerous health conditions.68 Another risk associated
with the overuse of antibiotics is the increased presence of
antimicrobial-resistant bacteria in animal waste.69 “[S]tudies
have found antibiotic-resistant bacteria in soil, surface and
ground water, air and wild animal populations near AFOs
(Animal Feeding Operations).”70 These bacteria can lead to
antibiotic-resistant intestinal infections, “either through direct
contact with animals and animal environments or through
contaminated drinking or swimming water.”71
63. See Hanan H. Abdelbaky et al., A Review on Current Knowledge of
Major Zoonotic Protozoan Diseases Affecting Farm and Pet Animals, 2 GER. J.
VETERINARY RSCH. 61, 64 (2021) (summarizing the “control measures for major
zoonotic protozoan diseases”).
64. See Graham & Nachman, supra note 16, at 653 (noting that antibiotic
use in farming operations ranges from “13 to 70% of all antimicrobial use in
the US,” but also that estimates vary because there are not regulations in place
that require “public reporting of actual use”).
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. See id.
69. See id. (“[T]he use of sub-therapeutic antimicrobials increases the
likelihood that antimicrobial resistant bacteria are present in the waste.”).
70. Id. at 652.
71. Antibiotic Resistance, Food, and Food Animals, CDC,
https://perma.cc/A9AH-FE4H (last updated Oct. 26, 2021).
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Some may argue that the potential use of antibiotics in
day-to-day farming practices poses less of a threat in recent
years because of FDA guidance documents suggesting that
farms should discontinue the practice.72 While recognition from
the FDA that “the use of medically important antimicrobial
drugs for production purposes in food-producing animals does
not represent a judicious use of these drugs”73 represents a step
in the right direction, the guidance documents are merely
permissive.74 Thus, they do not create legally enforceable
responsibilities for agricultural facilities to discontinue the use
of preventative or daily antibiotics.75
Discharge into neighboring water can also cause serious
harm to ecological communities, including marine life and
commercial fisheries.76 For example, “discharge of hog
waste . . . affects the aquatic ecosystems as it ends up polluting
larger water bodies, killing fish and depleting food and economic
resources of the communities.”77 Most commonly, these effects
are caused by a “dead zone,” “an area of depleted oxygen that

72. See FDA, NEW ANIMAL DRUGS AND NEW ANIMAL DRUG COMBINATION
PRODUCTS ADMINISTERED IN OR ON MEDICATED FEED OR DRINKING WATER OF
FOOD-PRODUCING ANIMALS: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR DRUG SPONSORS FOR
VOLUNTARILY ALIGNING PRODUCT USE CONDITIONS WITH GFI #213, at 4 (2013)
[hereinafter GFI #213], https://perma.cc/9UUW-DX52 (PDF) (recommending
that
antibiotic
use
in
animals
be
limited
to
“medically
important . . . uses . . . that are considered necessary for assuring animal
health, and . . . uses in animals that include veterinary oversight or
consultation”).
73. Id.
74. See id. at 3 (“This guidance represents the [FDA’s] current thinking
on this topic. It does not create or confer any rights for or on any person and
does not operate to bind FDA or the public.”).
75. See id. at 2–26 (stating “Contains Nonbinding Recommendations” at
the top of every page). But see Timeline of FDA Action on Antimicrobial
Resistance, FDA, https://perma.cc/S6ST-AGXF (last updated Apr. 30, 2021)
(noting that the 2017 implementation of GFI #213 transitioned the use of
medically important antimicrobial drugs to “requir[e] veterinary oversight and
eliminate[] production use” (emphasis added)). The FDA’s proclivity to use
compulsory language to describe this guidance document is interesting
considering, again, the document is nonbinding.
76. See Bradley R. Finney, Agricultural Law Stifles Innovation and
Competition, 72 ALA. L. REV. 785, 797 (2021).
77. Abel Radian, Factory Farming and Environmental Racism, FACTORY
FARMING AWARENESS COAL. (Aug. 5, 2020), https://perma.cc/4KKY-683U.
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kills and displaces fish and marine life and is caused primarily
by nutrient . . . runoff from agriculture.”78
Beside the dangers to clean water, fumes from confined
barns and the spray-field-land-application method79 pose
additional risks to clean air by releasing “ammonia, hydrogen
sulfide, and other gases.”80 “The components of the particulate
matter found in concentrated animal production systems may
include soil particles, bedding materials, fecal matter, litter, and
feed, as well as bacteria, fungi, and viruses.”81 Inhalation of the
particulate matter can lead to chronic respiratory symptoms.82
Specifically, exposures to “organic dusts from livestock barns
and confinements . . . can lead to increased rates of COPD,
asthma, hypersensitivity pneumonitis, interstitial lung disease,
and possibly lung cancer.”83 Recently, the National Academy of
Sciences published a comprehensive assessment of deaths in the
United States resulting from airborne agricultural pollutants in
which it stated that “[p]oor air quality is the largest
environmental health risk in the United States and
worldwide.”84 The assessment revealed that “[a]griculture is a
major contributor to air pollution,” resulting in approximately
15,900 “annual air quality-related deaths . . . from food

78. Finney, supra note 76, at 797.
79. See supra notes 32–33 and accompanying text.
80. MILLER, supra note 59, at 8; see Selçuk Arslan & Ali Aybek,
Particulate Matter Exposure in Agriculture, in AIR POLLUTION: A
COMPREHENSIVE PERSPECTIVE 73, 84 (Budi Haryanto ed., 2021) (“Class of
animal, animal activity levels, type of bedding material, cleanliness of the
buildings, temperature, relative humidity, ventilation rate, stocking density,
and feeding method are among the factors affecting the dust concentrations in
animal production.”); Tara M. Nordgren & Kristina L. Bailey, Pulmonary
Health Effects of Agriculture, 22 CURRENT OP. PULMONARY MED. 144, 144.
81. Arslan & Aybek, supra note 80, at 84.
82. Cf. id. (“Compared to non farmers, pig, poultry or cattle farmers have
greater prevalence of work related and chronic respiratory symptoms.”).
83. Nordgren & Bailey, supra note 80, at 144.
84. Nina G. G. Domingo et al., Air Quality-Related Health Damages of
Food, PROCEEDINGS OF THE NAT’L ACAD. OF SCIS., Mar. 18, 2021, at 1.
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production” in the United States.85 Of these annual deaths, 80
percent are attributable to animal-based food production.86
Despite courts taking note of the serious environmental and
public health risks associated with current agricultural waste
disposal systems,87 legislators seem to turn a blind eye and
regulatory laws continue to fail the communities most affected.88
And while the risk of encountering dangerous byproducts from
agricultural waste is serious for anyone, it is a much more
probable risk for the communities neighboring agricultural
areas.89 As discussed fully in the next Part, livestock operations
are often located in minority and low-income communities,
placing the most serious environmental and health impacts of
CAFOs in the backyards of some of the most powerless political
communities.90
D.

Environmental Justice: Protect the Neighbors

While CAFOs produce over 50 percent of all food animals,91
the environmental and health impacts of the production fall on
the few: the nearby communities. These communities are

85. Id. “In the United States alone, atmospheric fine particulate matter
from anthropogenic sources is responsible for about 100,000 premature deaths
each year, one-fifth of which are linked to agriculture.” Id.
86. Id. at 2. The researchers attribute this figure to deaths directly caused
by livestock production (43%) and deaths indirectly linked to livestock
production via impacts of animal feed production. Id.
87. See, e.g., Waterkeeper All. v. EPA, 853 F.3d 527, 529 (D.C. Cir. 2017)
(“[A]s waste breaks down, it emits serious pollutants—most notably ammonia
and hydrogen sulfide.”); Waterkeeper All. v. EPA, 399 F.3d 486, 494 (2d Cir.
2005) (“Animal waste includes a number of potentially harmful
pollutants. . . . These pollutants can infiltrate the surface waters in a variety
of ways.”); Cmty. Ass’n for Restoration of the Env’t v. Henry Bosma Dairy, 65
F. Supp. 2d 1129, 1133 (E.D. Wash. 1999).
88. See infra Part II.A.
89. See Radian, supra note 77.
90. See David H. Harris, Jr., The Industrialization of Agriculture and
Environmental Racism: A Deadly Combination Affecting Neighborhoods and
the Dinner Table, 7 RACE, POVERTY & THE ENV’T 39, 39 (“The same economic
neglect that makes people of color communities and low-income communities
prime targets of the usual polluting industrial activities also makes them
prime targets of the environmental harm cause by agribusiness’ efforts to
monopolize our food supply through unsustainable production methods.”).
91. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
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predominantly low-income and communities of color.92 This is
not an accident—it is an intentional tactic on the part of the
agriculture industry.93 Environmental activists call this
environmental racism, defined as the phenomenon by which
“Black, Brown, and Indigenous communities and low-income
communities . . . are burden[ed] with a disproportionate
number of facilities that fill the air, soil, and water with
contaminants.”94 It is “no mistake that these companies targeted
the communities they did. They did it because they perceived
the communities to have the least amount of political and
economic power to fight them.”95 Industrial farms also move into
these areas because land is cheaper.96 Additionally, these
facilities create jobs.97 Because rural residents in low-income
communities value the promise of economic stability, they are
more likely to “accept [] negative health consequences and
adverse effects on the environment in order to have a job.”98
One of the most documented instances of environmental
racism by food-animal production is in the North Carolina pork

92. See, e.g., Sacoby M. Wilson et al., Environmental Injustice and the
Mississippi Hog Industry, 110 ENV’T HEALTH PERSP. 195, 199 (“[T]he majority
of the Mississippi’s industrial hog operations are located in areas with high
percentages of African Americans and persons in poverty.”); Christine
Ball-Blakely, CAFOs: Plaguing North Carolina Communities of Color, 18
SUSTAINABLE DEV. L. & POL’Y 4 (discussing the impact of the pork industry on
communities of color and low-income communities in North Carolina).
93. See CAFOs Distribution of Confinements, N.C. ENV’T JUST. NETWORK,
https://perma.cc/ANF8-ZRJX (“[C]orporations are lured by pro-business tax
incentives, lax environmental regulations, minimal oversight, and encounter
little push back from community residents.”).
94. Environmental
Racism,
FOOD
EMPOWERMENT
PROJECT,
https://perma.cc/PGA3-2KBC (last updated Jan. 2022).
95. How the Meat Industry Thrives on Environmental Racism, MERCY FOR
ANIMALS, https://perma.cc/LJM5-TQPH.
96. See Environmental Racism, supra note 94 (“[B]ecause of the distinct
connections between race and class in the United States, poor rural areas tend
to house Black, Brown, and Indigenous communities and the land in these
areas is cheaper.”).
97. See Ag and Food Sectors and the Economy, USDA,
https://perma.cc/3WNC-BHZC (“In 2020, 19.7 million full- and part-time jobs
were related to the agricultural and food sectors.”) (last updated Feb. 24, 2022).
98. Environmental Racism, supra note 94.
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industry.99 “Industrial hog operations in North Carolina are
disproportionately located in communities of low-income people
and people of color, where inadequate housing, poor nutrition,
lack of access to medical care, and simultaneous exposure to
other environmental and occupational hazards may exacerbate
their impact.”100 In North Carolina, the human population only
slightly outnumbers the hog population.101 But the hogs are
predominantly housed in farms located in the Southeastern part
of the state, with the most densely populated operations located
in Duplin and Sampson Counties.102 In Duplin County, the hogs
outnumber people approximately thirty to one.103 In this region,
the human population is made up primarily of communities
living below the poverty line and non-white, mostly Black,
communities.104 This is especially poignant considering that the
eastern plains region of North Carolina, a section of the “Black
Belt,”105 is “a region where the agricultural economy was first

99. This is due largely to research headed by epidemiologist Steve Wing
and his colleagues at the University of North Carolina. See infra notes
100–102 and accompanying text.
100. Steve Wing et al., Integrating Epidemiology, Education, and
Organizing the Environmental Justice: Community Health Effects of
Industrial Hog Operations, 98 AM. J. OF PUB. HEALTH 1390, 1390–91
[hereinafter Wing et al., Community Health Effects].
101. See QuickFacts North Carolina, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (estimating a
10,551,162 population as of July 1, 2021); USDA, QUARTERLY HOGS AND PIGS 6
(2021), (estimating a total inventory of 8,500,000 hogs located in North
Carolina in September 2021).
102. See Steve Wing et al., Environmental Injustice in North Carolina’s
Hog Industry, 108 ENV’T HEALTH PERSPS. 225, 227 (2000) [hereinafter Wing et
al., Env’t Injustice] (“The dense area of operations in the southeastern part of
the state is centered on Duplin and Sampson Counties, the two largest
hog-producing counties in the United States.”).
103. See Doug Bock Clark, Why Is China Treating North Carolina Like the
Developing World?, ROLLING STONE (Mar. 19, 2018), https://perma.cc/KHZ6ZVVJ (noting that this estimate equates to “about 2,450 pigs per square mile”).
104. See Wing et al., Env’t Injustice, supra note 102, at 227 (noting that
the highest-poverty areas are in North Carolina’s eastern coastal plain, areas
with higher proportions of non-white communities compared to the entire
state). “An exception to the primarily African American makeup of the state’s
[eastern] nonwhite population is Robeson County, . . . home to the Lumbee
Indians and its population is approximately one-third Native American.” Id.
105. See Ball-Blakely, supra note 92, at 4 (“The Black Belt, a
crescent-shaped band throughout the South where slaves worked on
plantations, runs squarely through eastern North Carolina, . . . [and] has
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built on the basis of slave labor.”106 Although residents of these
areas have complained about the concentrated farming and its
impact on quality of life since the 1990s, they have received
chilled responses from legislators.107 Instead of taking the
resident’s worries seriously, elected officials tended to point
towards the legality of the operations, requesting “research that
documented problems, [and] placing the burden of proof on the
public and the communities themselves.”108 Although colloquial
accounts of the hog waste problem are vast,109 “most community
members d[o] not have experience conducting research,”110 and
they lack resources to examine the quantitative impacts that
agricultural land use and waste management practices have on
their quality of life.111 As a result, the stinky status quo persists.
The situation in North Carolina is not an isolated
occurrence—environmental racism and injustice resulting from
industrial farming exists throughout the United States. In
Mississippi, hog operations are similarly located in low-income
and Black communities.112 In Maryland, poultry CAFOs and
meat processing facilities are disproportionately located in
low-income and minority communities, respectively.113 In
California, there is evidence that dairy farms are

historically been defined as those places with a black population majority at
the time of the Civil War.” (quotations omitted)).
106. Wing et al., Env’t Injustice, supra note 102, at 225.
107. See Wing et al., Community Health Effects, supra note 100, at 1391.
108. Id.
109. See, e.g., Barry Yeoman, “It Smells Like a Decomposing Body”: North
Carolina’s Polluting Pig Farms, THE GUARDIAN (Aug. 27, 2019),
https://perma.cc/6GWS-RS6F; see also Wing et al., Community Health Effects,
supra note 100, at 1391 (devising an epidemiological study based on interviews
with hog farm neighbors in North Carolina to determine the effect on quality
of life).
110. Wing et al., Community Health Effects, supra note 100, at 1391.
111. Id. at 1390.
112. See Wilson et al., supra note 92, at 195 (“At increasing levels of
percentage African Americans and percentage of persons in poverty, there are
2.4–3.6 times more operations compared with the referent group.”).
113. See Jonathan Hall et al., Environmental Injustice and Industrial
Chicken Farming in Maryland, 18 INT’L J. OF ENV’T RSCH. & PUB. HEALTH 1, 11
(2021) (using hot spot analysis to determine the associations between
environmental justice variables and the location of Maryland CAFOs and
meatpacking facilities).

SOMETHING STINKS

1559

disproportionately located in Latinx communities.114 While the
racial and economic makeup of communities surrounding
industrial farms is not well-documented across all states,
Geographic Information System (GIS) mapping115 and the
history of the United States exploiting raw materials from rural
America116 suggest that the trend of environmental racism
surrounding agricultural operations is pervasive.
II.

REGULATORY LANDSCAPE

Although the problem is clear, and the negative human and
environmental health effects are well established, federal and
state laws fail to protect the affected communities. This Part will
discuss the failings of the federal and state regulatory systems
governing agricultural waste. First, it will discuss three federal
regulatory schemes that implicate agricultural waste
disposal.117 Next, it will discuss state laws regulating (or, more
accurately, protecting) agricultural operations.118
A.

Federal Regulatory Scheme (or Lack Thereof)

While federal regulations protect against multiple types of
dangerous waste emissions,119 there is no federal regulatory
scheme that specifically targets agricultural waste. Instead, this
Subpart will focus on three Acts that target general waste
114. See FOOD EMPOWERMENT PROJECT, supra note 94 (noting that of the
“[m]ore that 5.2 million cows” located in California, a majority are located in
the San Joaquin Valley, where the “population is 49 percent Latinx”).
115. See EnvironAtlas Interactive Map, EPA, https://perma.cc/Z6R2-QZUS
(tracking “hundreds of data layers relating to ecosystem services, biodiversity,
people, and the built environment”). For example, combining the layers
“[p]ercentage of households below the quality of life threshold income” and
“[m]anure application” shows that overlap is most prevalent in locations
known for livestock production, including areas around Fayetteville,
Arkansas. Id.
116. See PEW COMM’N ON INDUS. FARM ANIMAL PROD., PUTTING MEAT ON THE
TABLE: INDUSTRIAL FARM ANIMAL PRODUCTION IN AMERICA 41 (2008) (“Rural
America has long been this country’s main supplier of raw materials.”).
117. See infra Part II.A.
118. See infra Part II.B.
119. See, e.g., Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401–7671q (establishing a
comprehensive federal regulatory scheme to protect against air pollution);
Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251–1388 (regulating quality standards for
surface waters).
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disposal and pollution: the Resource Conservation and Recovery
Act (RCRA),120 the Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA, also known as
“Superfund”),121 and the Clean Water Act (CWA).122
RCRA is the primary federal scheme regulating the
generation, transportation, treatment, storage, and disposal of
hazardous waste.123 While RCRA works on the front end to track
hazardous waste from “cradle-to-grave,”124 CERCLA works on
the back end to “respond directly to releases or threatened
releases of hazardous substances” and issue clean-up plans.125
Lastly, the CWA regulates the discharge of pollutants into the
waters of the United States through a federal permitting
system.126 These federal programs are expansive, but each
carves out an explicit exception or implicit loophole for
agricultural waste.
1.

RCRA and CERCLA: An Explicit Regulatory Exemption

Under RCRA and CERCLA, Congress authorized the EPA
to manage the “development of solid waste management plans”
and “assur[e] that hazardous wastes management practices are
conducted in a manner which protects human health and the
environment.”127 Because agricultural waste is not designated
as “hazardous waste” under either RCRA or CERCLA, it is not

120. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901–6992.
121. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601–9675.
122. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251–1388.
123. Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) Overview, EPA,
https://perma.cc/G8C4-GW94 (last updated July 14, 2021).
124. Id.
125. Superfund: CERCLA Overview, EPA, https://perma.cc/3RAP-S4YW
(last updated Jan. 4, 2021).
126. Summary of the Clean Water Act, EPA, https://perma.cc/VRQ6-6Q6Y
(last updated Oct. 22, 2021).
127. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6902(a)(1)–(6); see id. § 6903. All definitions of solid and
hazardous wastes adopted by Congress in RCRA apply to CERCLA
regulations. See 42 U.S.C. § 9601(14) (including within the term “hazardous
substance” “any hazardous waste having the characteristics identified under
or listed pursuant to section 3001 of the Solid Waste Disposal Act,” codified at
42 U.S.C. § 6921, which is part of RCRA).
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subject to federal regulation under this comprehensive
scheme.128
RCRA defines “hazardous waste” as “a solid
waste . . . which because of its quantity, concentration, or
physical, chemical, or infectious characteristics may” lead to an
“increase in mortality” or “serious . . . illness” or “pose a
substantial present or potential hazard to human health or the
environment when improperly treated, stored, transported, or
disposed of, or otherwise managed.”129 RCRA defines “solid
waste” broadly, as “any garbage, refuse, sludge from a waste
treatment plant, water supply treatment plant, or air pollution
control facility and other discarded material, including solid,
liquid, semisolid, or contained gaseous material resulting from
industrial, commercial, mining, and agricultural operations,
and from community activities.”130 The EPA further defines
“solid waste” as “any discarded material,” including material
that is “[a]bandoned,” and in some circumstances “[r]ecycled.”131
While the EPA has broad jurisdiction under RCRA to regulate
solid hazardous waste, the EPA has designated certain
materials “which are not solid wastes” and thus not subject to
regulation.132 Notably, the EPA excludes solid animal waste as
“hazardous” if it is returned to the soil as fertilizer.133 Since
almost all agricultural waste is returned to the soil as fertilizer,
it goes largely unchecked.134 This approach is particularly
illogical because scientific evidence clearly establishes that
128. See 40 C.F.R. 261.4(b)(ii) (establishing an exception for “solid wastes
generated by . . . [t]he raising of animals, including animal manures” that are
“returned to the soil as fertilizer”).
129. 42 U.S.C. § 6903.
130. Id. § 6903(27).
131. 40 C.F.R. § 261.2(a). The scope of the EPA’s jurisdiction over recycled
materials has been challenged. See, e.g., Am. Mining Cong. v. EPA, 824 F.2d
1177, 1183 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (holding that the EPA cannot regulate closed-loop
recycled material (“materials destined for reuse in an industry’s ongoing
production processes”) under RCRA because it is not “discarded material”).
132. 40 C.F.R. § 261.4.
133. See id. § 261.4(b)(2) (“Solid wastes . . . are not hazardous
wastes . . . [if] generated by [[t]he raising of animals, including animal
manures] which are returned to the soils as fertilizers.”).
134. See Graham & Nachman, supra note 16, at 649–50 (“[T]he USEPA
estimates ‘nearly all’ of the waste produced, including manure, litter and
process wastewater, is applied to land without any required pretreatment or
classification.”).
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agricultural waste is harmful to human health and the
environment, especially when returned to the soil as fertilizer.135
CERCLA adopts the statutory definitions of “hazardous”
from other environmental statutes and thus has broader
jurisdiction than RCRA alone.136 Additionally, CERCLA further
defines “hazardous substance” as “any element, compound,
mixture, solution, or substance” designated as “hazardous” by
the EPA.137 The EPA may promulgate regulations designating
substances as “hazardous” that, “when released into the
environment[,] may present substantial danger to the public
health or welfare or the environment.”138 Thus, the EPA has the
authority under CERCLA to explicitly regulate the cleanup of
agricultural waste which poses a “substantial danger,” but it has
not.139
Instead, the EPA has promulgated regulations that provide
specific reporting exemptions to agricultural facilities.140 In
2008, for example, the EPA promulgated a rule that exempted
all farms from reporting air releases from animal waste under
CERCLA.141 While this final rule was ultimately vacated,142 the
135. See supra Part I.C.
136. See 42 U.S.C. § 9601(14) (extending jurisdiction pursuant to CERLCA
to any “hazardous substance,” including those defined by the CWA, RCRA,
CAA, and the Toxic Substances Control Act). The only explicit exception of a
“hazardous substance” under CERCLA applies to petroleum. Id. Additionally,
CERCLA creates an exemption for “the normal application of fertilizer,” not
because fertilizer isn’t hazardous, but because the application is not considered
a “release.” Id. § 9601(22).
137. Id.
138. Id. § 9602(a).
139. Id.
140. See, e.g., CERCLA/EPCRA Administrative Reporting Exemption for
Air Releases of Hazardous Substances from Animal Waste at Farms, 73 Fed.
Reg. 76,948, 76,948 (2008) (exempting “releases of hazardous substances to
the air that meet or exceed their reportable quantity where the source of those
hazardous substances is animal waste at farms”). These exemptions are
notable because the EPA has explicitly acknowledged that byproducts from
animal wastes, including ammonia and hydrogen sulfide, are hazardous. See
40 C.F.R. § 302.4 (listing the reportable quantity of both ammonia and
hydrogen sulfide as 100 pounds).
141. 73 Fed. Reg. at 76,948.
142. See Waterkeeper All. v. EPA, 853 F.3d 527, 537–38 (D.C. 2017)
(finding that the EPA’s action could not be “justified either as a reasonable
interpretation of any statutory ambiguity or implementation of a de minimus
exception”).
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EPA’s reasoning for promulgating the rule—“that notifications
of animal-waste-related releases serve no regulatory purpose
because it would be ‘impractical or unlikely’ to respond to such
a release”—shines a light on its enforcement policies regarding
animal-waste disposal.143 Specifically, the EPA asserted that “in
most cases, a federal response is impractical and unlikely,”144
and that it could “not foresee a situation where [it] would
initiate a response action as a result of such notification.”145 In
fact, the EPA noted in its proposed rule that “it has never taken
response action based on notifications of air releases from
animal waste.”146
But the EPA’s failure to respond to reports of hazardous
animal waste releases is not due to a finding that there is no
“substantial risk” of harm.147 The D.C. Circuit actually noted
that commenters in this rulemaking provided a “good deal of
information not refuted by the EPA” detailing scenarios in
which reporting animal-waste-air emissions “could be quite
helpful in fulfilling the statutes’ goals.”148 Specifically, the
commenters focused on manure pits, which, when agitated for
pumping, rapidly release hydrogen sulfide, methane, and
ammonia, which even the EPA conceded “may cause emissions

143. See id. at 537 (noting that “it’s not at all clear why” an EPA response
to these kinds of releases would be impractical if agricultural methods of waste
disposal “lead to toxic levels of hazardous substances”).
144. See id. at 536–37 (emphasis added) (“The qualification suggests that
at least some circumstances would call for response.”).
145. Id.
146. Id. at 531. In proposing the rule, the EPA relied explicitly on its
history of not responding to air releases of hazardous substances from animal
waste at farms. See CERCLA/EPCRA Administrative Reporting Exemption
for Air Releases of Hazardous Substances from Animal Waste, 72 Fed. Reg.
73700, 73704 (proposed Dec. 28, 2007) (“[T]o date, EPA has not initiated a
response to any NRC notifications of ammonia, hydrogen sulfide, or any other
hazardous substances released to the air where animal waste at farms is the
source of that release.”).
147.
The EPA previously classified ammonia and hydrogen sulfide, two of
the most common byproducts of animal waste, as “hazardous substances.” See
40 C.F.R. 302.4 (including ammonia and hydrogen sulfide, but also nitrous
oxide, methane, and certain volatile organic compounds also found in animal
waste).
148. Waterkeeper All., 853 F.3d at 536.
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to exceed reportable quantities.”149 Despite recognizing the risks
from agricultural waste, the EPA chose not to act, a choice
permitted under the agency’s broad authority to enforce—or not
enforce—regulatory cleanup actions.150 Regardless, Congress
settled the debate in 2018 when it passed the Fair Agricultural
Reporting Method Act (the “FARM Act”),151 which amended
CERCLA to explicitly “exempt air emissions from animal waste
at a farm from reporting.”152
CERCLA, like RCRA, also provides an exemption from
reporting releases of “[n]ormal application of fertilizers” from
any farm.153 CERCLA itself does not define “[n]ormal
application of fertilizer,” the EPA has not issued relevant
guidance, and district courts faced with the issue have construed
the exemption according to its “ordinary meaning” within its
factual context.154 Because the application of animal waste as
149. See id. (noting that the EPA’s concession was “truly an
understatement” as the “risk isn’t just theoretical; people have become
seriously ill and even died as a result of pit agitation”).
150. CERCLA requires “parties to notify authorities when large quantities
of hazardous materials . . . are released into the environment,” and “[o]n
learning of such a release, the EPA has broad powers to take remedial actions.”
Id. at 530; see also 40 C.F.R. § 300.130(c) (authorizing, but not requiring,
response “when the Administrator or Secretary determines that any
hazardous substance is released . . . which may present an imminent and
substantial danger to the public health or welfare of the United States”).
151. Pub. L. 115-141, 132 Stat. 348 (2018).
152. CERCLA and EPCRA Reporting Requirements for Air Releases of
Hazardous
Substances
from
Animal
Waste
at
Farms,
EPA,
https://perma.cc/BNZ9-8Y4K (last updated May 20, 2021). While never passed,
bills have been introduced to Congress attempting to exempt all applications
of manure from CERCLA reporting. See S. 1729, 112th Cong. (2011) (proposing
to “exempt from notification requirements applicable to releases from facilities
of hazardous substances any release associated with manure as defined under
CERCLA”); Superfund Common Sense Act, H.R. 2997, 112th Cong. (2011)
(proposing an exception to CERCLA for manure).
153. See 42 U.S.C. § 9601(22) (“The term ‘release’ means any spilling,
leaking, pumping, pouring, emitting, emptying, discharging, injecting,
escaping, leaching, dumping, or disposing into the environment, . . . but
excludes . . . the normal application of fertilizer.”); see also Laws and
Regulations that Apply to Your Agricultural Operation by Statute, EPA,
https://perma.cc/WKV4-6EZT (last updated Feb. 26, 2021).
154. See City of Tulsa v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 258 F. Supp. 2d 1263, 1287
(N.D. Okla. 2003), vacated, No. 01 CV 0900EA(C), 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
23416 (N.D. Okla. July 16, 2003); Sheridan v. D&D Grading, Inc., No.
16-CV-5085(JS)(ARL), 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 54340, at *12 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 29,
2019) (construing “normal” in accordance with its ordinary meaning and

SOMETHING STINKS

1565

fertilizer is a common practice and method of waste disposal,155
this exemption almost completely protects farms from CERCLA
liability. Additionally, regulatory exemptions disincentivize
farmers from exploring more environmentally friendly options
for waste disposal156—there is no incentive for change if the
norm is exempt from liability. These reporting exemptions act
as a shield from CERCLA liability for agricultural operations,
regardless of whether these releases exceed reportable
quantities of hazardous substances.157
2.

CWA: No Permit Necessary

The Clean Water Act regulates water pollution and makes
it “unlawful to discharge any pollutant from a point source into
navigable waters, unless a permit [is] obtained.”158 While the
Act is widely considered a sweeping success,159 it fails to
adequately regulate discharges of animal waste pollution.
The Act defines “point source” as “any discernable, confined
and discrete conveyance . . . from which pollutants are or may
be discharged,”160 including CAFOs.161 The EPA defines a CAFO
as an animal feeding operation “where more than 1,000 ‘animal
units’ . . . are confined,” or where “more than 300 animal units
are confined” and “pollutants are discharged into navigable

finding that “applying topsoil that contains numerous CERCLA hazardous
substances is not ‘the normal application of fertilizer’”).
155. See Graham & Nachman, supra note 16, at 649–50 (estimating that
“nearly all” agricultural waste from “food animals” is applied to the land as
fertilizer).
156. See, e.g., Yun Xie, The Ambiguity of Sustainable Farming, AM. ASS’N
FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF SCI. (Nov. 4, 2010), https://perma.cc/Q6TR-HF99
(arguing that Walmart has no incentive to practice “environmentally sound
farming practices” “[w]ithout regulations for sustainable farming”).
157. See supra notes 147–152 and accompanying text.
158. Summary of the Clean Water Act, supra note 126.
159. See William L. Andreen, Success and Backlash: The Remarkable
(Continuing) Story of the Clean Water Act, 4 J. ENERGY & ENV’T L. 25, 26 (2013)
(“Both municipal and industrial discharges have declined sharply, the loss of
wetlands has been cut decisively, and water quality has broadly improved
across the country . . . without causing any significant harm to the economy in
terms of employment, growth, or investment. It is, in short, a real success
story.”).
160. 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14).
161. Id.
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waters” either directly or through a manmade ditch, or other
similar manmade device.162 While this may appear expansive, it
is deceptively so. An “animal unit” is not a measurement of how
many animals are on a farm but instead is equivalent to “1,000
pounds of live weight,” meaning that the number of confined
animals necessary for any farm to qualify as a CAFO changes
depending on the type of livestock.163 Specifically, for a farm to
be a point source and therefore subject to CWA permitting
requirements, it must house at least “1000 head of beef cattle,
700 dairy cows, 2500 swine weighing more than 55 [pounds], 125
thousand broiler chickens, or 82 thousand laying hens.”164 This
significantly narrows the number of farms regulated as point
sources under the CWA.165
The Act classifies all discharges not regulated as point
sources, by default, as nonpoint sources, which are largely
exempt from federal regulation.166 Nonpoint source pollution, as
the name may suggest, “comes from many diffuse sources” and
“generally results from land runoff, precipitation, atmospheric
deposition, drainage, seepage or hydrologic modification.”167
Environmentalists and scholars view the nonpoint source

162. USDA & EPA, UNIFIED NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR ANIMAL FEEDING
OPERATIONS § 4.2 (1999).
163. Animal Feeding Operations (AFO) and Concentrated Animal Feeding
Operations (CAFO), USDA, https://perma.cc/3LG7-69X4.
164. Id.
165. For example, according to the 2017 Census of Agriculture, a total of
66,439 hog farms were operating in the United States, with only 8,324 farms
housing 2,000 to 5,000 or more hogs and pigs. See 2017 CENSUS, supra note 19,
at 24 tbl. 21. Considering only farms that house “2500 swine” are subject to
CWA permitting, and assuming the hogs and pigs included in the census
weighed more than 55 pounds and were confined, at least 58,115 hog and pig
farms were untouched by the CWA’s permitting system in 2017. Id. To put this
into perspective, the 2017 Census reported that U.S. farms housed a total of
72,381,007 hogs and pigs. Id. Of this total, 20,163,804 hogs and pigs, at most,
were housed in farms that may qualify as point sources under the CWA. Id.
This leaves over 52,217,203 hogs and pigs—approximately 72 percent of the
swine population—whose waste was completely unregulated under the CWA.
Id.
166. See Basic Information About Nonpoint Source (NPS) Pollution, EPA,
https://perma.cc/MAT7-DV5P (last updated July 8, 2021) [hereinafter Basic
Information About NPS Pollution].
167. Id.
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program as “[t]he most significant problem” of the CWA.168 The
Act leaves regulation of nonpoint sources primarily to state and
local governments, and the current approach calls on states to
identify waters that are “impaired due to nonpoint source
pollution and then develop management plans to rectify the
problem.”169 Unfortunately, the Act only creates a voluntary
system for management plans, and, as a result, “nonpoint source
pollution has evolved into the largest single source of water
quality impairment in the country.”170
Negative
environmental
impacts
resulting
from
agricultural waste often fall into this greater problem of
nonpoint source regulation.171 The EPA has long recognized that
“animal manure and wastewater . . . is commonly applied to
land.”172 Because the Act exempts “agricultural stormwater
discharges,”173 the EPA stated in 1999 that it “has in the past,
and will in the future, assume that discharges from the vast
majority of agricultural operations are exempted from the
NPDES [point source] program.”174 Today, the EPA still
categorizes “[e]xcess fertilizers . . . from agricultural lands” and
“[b]acteria and nutrients from livestock, [and] pet wastes” as
nonpoint sources,175 despite its acknowledgement that runoff
from farms is a leading source of pollution affecting U.S.
waterways.176 Thus, the structure of the CWA allows many
industrial farms to escape most, if not all, regulatory impact.

168. See Andreen, supra note 159, at 27 (arguing that nonpoint pollution
“was treated as something of an afterthought left primarily in the hands of
state and local government”).
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. See USDA & EPA, supra note 162, § 4.4 (acknowledging that a large
portion of agricultural discharges are considered nonpoint sources and that
“[p]roper land application of these resources has agricultural benefits, but
improper land application can cause water quality and potential public health
impacts”).
172. Id.
173. 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14).
174. USDA & EPA, supra note 162, § 4.4.
175. See Basic Information About NPS Pollution, supra note 166.
176. See id.
States report that nonpoint source pollution is the leading
remaining cause of water quality problems. The effects of nonpoint
source pollutants on specific waters vary and may not always be
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B.

State Waste Regulation

State regulations of agricultural waste have similarly failed
to “ke[ep] pace with the growth and increased concentration of
food-animal production.”177 While federal environmental acts
commonly authorize regulation based on risk assessment,178
common methods of regulating agricultural waste at the state
level center around industry norms179 and land use.180 As
discussed, creating waste regulations pursuant to industry
standards is not environmentally safe because common
agricultural practices follow the money with little regard to
environmental impact.181 Land-use regulation is typically in the
form of zoning laws, which simply designate agricultural

fully assessed. However, we know that these pollutants have
harmful effects on drinking water supplies, recreation, fisheries
and wildlife.
see also EPA, PROTECTING WATER QUALITY FROM AGRICULTURAL RUNOFF 1
(2005) (“Did you know that runoff from farms is the leading source of
impairments to the surveyed rivers and lakes?”).
177. See Graham & Nachman, supra note 16, at 655; see also Finney, supra
note 76, at 787 (“Agriculture operates in a complex mosaic of federal and state
environmental laws, from which it is largely exempt—to its own benefit.”).
178. See COMM. ON IMPROVING RISK ANALYSIS APPROACHES USED BY THE
U.S. EPA, NAT’L RSCH. COUNCIL, SCIENCE AND DECISIONS: ADVANCING RISK
ASSESSMENT 3 (2009).
179. See, e.g., Agriculture Waste & Disposal, ILL. ENV’T PROT. AGENCY,
https://perma.cc/EJ2R-XTYR (“Livestock waste generated and applied on the
same farm may be composted under normal agricultural practices without a
permit from the Illinois EPA.” (emphasis added)).
180. “[L]and-use planning is among the powers retained by the
states . . . [and] local governments have a large degree of autonomy to control
land use within their jurisdictions.” ORG. FOR ECON. COOP. & DEV., THE
GOVERNANCE OF LAND USE: COUNTRY FACT SHEET UNITED STATES 1–2 (2017).
Notably, many state Right-to-Farm laws have zoning restrictions. See, e.g., VA.
CODE ANN. § 3.2-301 (“No locality shall enact zoning ordinances that would
unreasonably restrict or regulate farm structures or farming . . . practices in
an agricultural district unless such restrictions bear a relationship to the
health, safety, and general welfare of its citizens.”) (2022); S.C. CODE ANN.
§ 46-45-60(B) (“[T]his section shall not preclude any right a county may have
to determine whether an agricultural use is a permitted use under the county’s
land use and zoning authority.”) (2022). As discussed below, these zoning
restrictions are primarily for agricultural protectionism, with little regard to
environmental impact. See infra Part III.B.
181. See supra Parts I.B–C.

SOMETHING STINKS

1569

activities to specific agricultural areas.182 While this may help
prevent conflicts and reduce nuisance in urban areas, it
concentrates the agricultural waste—and its dangerous
byproducts. This method also does little to protect communities
from the environmental impacts of agricultural waste if they
happen to live in an area zoned for agriculture.183
Alternatively, a minority of states have enacted nutrient
management regulations which govern manure application
rates.184 This is a move in the right direction but, unfortunately,
many of these laws only regulate a small number of animal
waste byproducts,185 still leaving communities vulnerable to
negative environmental and public health impacts.
Interestingly, a handful of states have turned to odor
regulation as a means of controlling animal waste
management.186 As previously discussed, federal environmental
statutes exist to regulate hazardous substances, air quality, and
water quality.187 But there is no federal statute that specifically
regulates odors.188 This is significant because environmental
odors, including those from CAFOs, are known to be toxic at
182. Cf. Can You Build a House on Agricultural Land?, MILLMAN NAT.
LAND SERVS. (Feb. 28, 2021), https://perma.cc/HX5K-UA6F. (“Agricultural
zoning is intended to protect farming activities . . . from non-farm uses.”).
183. See infra Part III.B. But see 53 P.S. § 10603(h) (“Zoning ordinances
may not restrict agricultural operations or changes to or expansions of
agricultural operations in geographic areas where agriculture has
traditionally been present unless the agricultural operation will have a direct
adverse effect on the public health and safety.”).
184. See R. MCDOUGALL, JURISDICTIONAL SCAN OF AGRICULTURAL WASTE
MANAGEMENT REGULATIONS AND GUIDELINES 8–11 (2010) (describing nutrient
management plans in Pennsylvania, Washington State, Texas, and
California).
185. See, e.g., id. at 8–9 (requiring only that “[m]anure application
rates . . . be nitrogen-limited” under Pennsylvania’s Nutrient Management
Regulations).
186. CDC, MENU OF STATE LAWS REGARDING ODORS PRODUCED BY
CONCENTRATED ANIMAL FEEDING OPERATIONS 1 (2016) [hereinafter STATE ODOR
LAWS].
187. See supra Part II.A.
188. STATE ODOR LAWS, supra note 186, at 1–2. But see Environmental
Odors: Frequently Asked Questions (FAQ), AGENCY FOR TOXIC SUBSTANCES &
DISEASE REGISTRY, https://perma.cc/XZQ2-QXYB (noting that, while no federal
statute regulates odors specifically, the National Ambient Air Quality
Standards regulate pollutants in outdoor air, including sulfur dioxide, the
“only regulated air pollutant with a strong, pungent odor”).
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high levels and cause harmful health effects.189 At lower levels,
or for people with lower odor sensitivity, environmental odors
may still “become a nuisance[,] causing temporary symptoms
such as headache and nausea.”190 Some states have enacted laws
to specifically regulate odors produced by CAFOs.191 Yet
communities living near CAFOs still complain about intense
odors,192 and, in nuisance cases involving factory farms, odor is
one of the most common complaints.193
Some may argue that state initiatives help resolve the
problem of animal waste management, at least incrementally,
but the negative impacts of agricultural waste disposal are no
longer local problems that can be fixed with a state-by-state
band-aid approach.194 Additionally, state laws that protect
agricultural operations, particularly state Right-to-Farm laws
as discussed in the following Part,195 stand as an additional
barrier to achieving environmentally friendly agricultural waste
management programs on a state-by-state level.
III. COMMON LAW BATTLEFRONT
While the federal regulatory options are, pardon the pun,
stinky, state regulations are similarly ineffective. What options
189. Environmental Odors: Frequently Asked Questions (FAQ), supra note
188 (observing that potentially toxic environmental odors may come from
many sources, including CAFOs, sewage, fires, oil refineries, and diesel
exhaust).
190. Id.
191. See STATE ODOR LAWS, supra note 186, at 2 (“Seven states require
CAFOs to submit an odor management, abatement, or control plan.”).
192. For example, Missouri laws related to odor controls only regulate
“CAFOs housing more than 7,000 animal units.” Id. Missouri residents that
live near smaller farms are still negatively affected by agricultural odors. See,
e.g., Eli Chen, North St. Louis Residents Want Foul-Smelling Farm Out of
Neighborhood, ST. LOUIS PUB. RADIO (June 21, 2020), https://perma.cc/RF77LX2Y.
193. See, e.g., McKiver v. Murphy-Brown, LLC, 980 F.3d 937, 954 (4th Cir.
2020) (noting that plaintiffs in a nuisance case against a large hog facility
complained of odors, stating that “the odor was ‘always annoying’” and
“literally unending”); Concerned Area Residents for the Env’t v. Southview
Farm, 834 F. Supp 1410, 1414 (W.D.N.Y. 1993) (alleging that “intense,
obnoxious odors have made the atmosphere at plaintiffs’ properties
unbearable or undesirable to breathe”).
194. See supra Part I.A.
195. See infra Parts III.B–D.
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are communities left with to remedy the negative physical and
environmental impacts of agricultural waste regulations?
Under normal circumstances, landowners may turn to common
law causes of action, particularly nuisance.196 Unfortunately,
state Right-to-Farm laws have effectively barred this option as
well.197
This Part first introduces how landowners have used
nuisance suits as a vehicle for environmental activism.198 Next,
it discusses the barrier created by state Right-to-Farm laws,
pro-agriculture laws that explicitly grant farmers an affirmative
defense against nuisance actions.199 It then analyzes McKiver v.
Murphy-Brown, a Fourth Circuit case upholding a substantial
jury verdict for plaintiffs who filed a nuisance suit against a
large hog farm in eastern North Carolina, and the reason why
the defendants’ Right-to-Farm defense failed.200 It concludes
with a discussion of legislative responses to McKiver, which
have been overwhelmingly agriculturally-protectionist.201
A.

Nuisance as Environmental Activism and its Drawbacks

Common law nuisance claims, designed to protect against
invasions of the use and enjoyment of land,202 have long been
used to seek redress against industrial facilities for damage to
the environment and neighboring properties.203 Now these
claims are primarily used only when regulations fail to
196. See infra Part III.A.
197. See infra Part III.B.
198. See infra Part III.A.
199. See infra Part III.B.
200. See infra Part III.C.
201. See infra Part III.D.
202. CHRISTINE H. KELLETT, UNDERSTANDING “RIGHT TO FARM” LAWS 1
(1999) (“A nuisance is defined at common law as a use of land by one party
which ‘unreasonably interferes with the comfortable enjoyment of life or
property of another.’”).
203. See ROBERT V. PERCIVAL ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION: LAW,
SCIENCE, AND POLICY 63 (7th ed. 2013) (“The common law articulates
foundational principles that have shaped the development of regulatory
programs.”); id. at 63–81 (detailing the history of private and public nuisance
suits to remedy interferences to the use and enjoyment of land, which provided
redress for actions that “endangered the health or property of large numbers
of people”).
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adequately protect a private or public interest.204 This is usually
because nuisance law is not as fit to remedy environmental
issues as is regulatory law. Regulatory law can prevent
environmental damages through permits, licensing, bans, and
incentive programs,205 but the most common remedy for
nuisance suits is damages.206 Generally, courts calculate
compensation proportionally to the defendant’s unreasonable
interference with the plaintiff’s property interest.207 While this
is obviously helpful for an individual plaintiff, it is an inherently
retroactive solution that does little to stop environmental harm
before it occurs.208 Additionally, damage awards from these
nuisance claims are unlikely to create a deterrent effect—large
industrial farms are prosperous enough that even a large payout
will not deter them from continuing tortious conduct.209 While
injunctions are available as an equitable remedy, in practice,
courts have, over time, become more and more hesitant to grant
them.210

204. Id. at 63 (“[The common law] retains considerable vitality as a safety
net when unregulated activities cause environmental harm.”).
205. See id. at 154–57 (listing regulatory approaches including technology
specifications, emission limits, ambient or harm-based standards, and
reporting requirements).
206. See
Nuisance,
CORNELL L. SCH. LEGAL INFO. INST.,
https://perma.cc/Q8X4-GPYX.
207. Cf. PERCIVAL ET AL., supra note 203, at 64–65 (“Liability is imposed
only in those cases where the harm or risk to one is greater than he ought to
be required to bear under the circumstances at least without compensation.”).
208. But see Serena M. Williams, The Anticipatory Nuisance Doctrine: One
Common Theory for Use in Environmental Justice Cases, 19 WM. & MARY ENV’T
L. & POL’Y REV. 223, 224 (1995) (suggesting the option of “anticipatory
nuisance . . . to prevent the siting of waste facilities in [a community] before
the accompanying harm can occur”).
209. See Andrew L. Frey, Corporate Finances: Punitive Damages’
800-Pound Gorilla, MAYER BROWN (Oct. 14, 2014), https://perma.cc/P23DR8RX (“A big company will not be deterred . . . by a punishment that is
proportionate only to the harm it has caused and the gravity of its misconduct
but not to its net worth, income, or revenues.”).
210. See PERCIVAL ET AL., supra note 203, at 67 (“U.S. courts [did not] issue
injunctions to shut down nuisances caused by economically important
activities, particularly if they could afford to compensate their victims.”). An
injunction “is a court order requiring a person to do or cease doing a specific
action.”
Injunction,
CORNELL
L.
SCH.
LEGAL
INFO.
INST.,
https://perma.cc/HQ2D-RQCV.
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Traditionally, common law nuisance “held actors strictly
liable when their actions interfered with property rights.”211
When the Industrial Revolution began, the strict liability
approach lost favor as courts cited “fears that nuisance actions
could bring industry to a halt.”212 Instead, courts traded the
strict liability approach for a balancing approach, through which
they would consider “the value of activities that generated
pollution against the rights of victims”213 and against the cost of
environmental damage.214 While courts continued to award
damages, many only issued injunctions “in cases where
environmental damage was quite severe.”215 For example, in
Madison v. Ducktown Sulphur, Copper & Iron Co.,216 a group of
small farm owners filed a nuisance claim against two iron
smelting companies for large volumes of smoke emanating from
their plants that destroyed the plaintiffs’ trees and crops.217 The
Tennessee Supreme Court refused to issue an injunction based
largely on an economic and social utility balancing approach,
finding that the smelting companies were worth nearly two
thousand times more than the plaintiffs’ property and that the
enterprise was “engaged in work of very great importance, not
only to [its] owners, but to the State and the whole country as
well.”218 This balancing approach has remained the
predominant test courts use to determine whether to grant an

211. PERCIVAL ET AL., supra note 203, at 64.
212. Id. at 65. Hole v. Barlow, (1858) 4 C.B.N.S. 334 (CP), is one of the first
cases to take this stance, holding that a brickmaking operation in industrial
England would not be held liable “despite the pollution it produced.” See
PERCIVAL ET AL., supra note 203, at 65 (“[N]o action lies for the use, the
reasonable use, of a lawful trade in a convenient and proper place even though
some one may suffer annoyance from its being carried on.” (citing Hole v.
Barlow, (1858) 4 C.B.N.S. 334 (CP)).
213. PERCIVAL ET AL., supra note 203, at 64.
214. See supra Part I.C.
215. PERCIVAL ET AL., supra note 203, at 70.
216. 83 S.W. 658 (Tenn. 1904).
217. Id. at 659.
218. Id. at 666–67. The Court clearly valued industry interests over the
plaintiffs’ property or environmental interests, relying heavily on the
companies’ value to society. See id. at 666 (“[S]hall we . . . grant their request
to blot out two great mining and manufacturing enterprises, destroy half of
the taxable values of a county, and drive more than 10,000 people from their
homes?”).
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injunction, and economic harm to the defendant continues to be
a prevalent factor.219
Because of inadequate and largely retroactive remedies,
common law nuisance claims are insufficient tools to prevent
environmental damages. In the context of agricultural waste, an
even greater barrier exists: Right-to-Farm laws. These state
protections create an affirmative defense for farmers faced with
a nuisance claim. Combined with ineffective regulatory options,
the Right-to-Farm affirmative defense effectively strips
individuals impacted by agricultural waste of any viable
remedy.
B.

State Right-to-Farm Laws

While nuisance actions remain available in theory to
remedy environmental issues caused by agricultural operations,
state Right-to-Farm laws make these suits practically difficult
to bring. State Right-to-Farm laws exist to protect farmers from
nuisance lawsuits related to production practices.220 Each state
has a Right-to-Farm law, and while many involve similar policy
goals,221 each law differs to fit the needs of the local agricultural
industry.222 Many of them rely in part on the assumption that
219. See Michael C. Blumm, A Dozen Landmark Nuisance Cases and Their
Environmental Significance, 62 ARIZ. L. REV. 403, 445 (2020) (“Large,
well-financed defendants may be able to successfully defeat nuisance claims
by invoking the balancing of economic equities . . . [b]y emphasizing the social
utility of their operations as well as their spillover economic effects.”). For an
example of this balancing approach in use, see Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co.,
257 N.E.2d 870, 872 (N.Y. App. Ct. 1970) (“The ground for the denial of
injunction . . . is the large disparity in economic consequences of the nuisance
and of the injunction.”). The Boomer Court ultimately granted the injunction,
but only conditionally—the factory could continue polluting upon payment of
damages. Id. at 875.
220. States’
Right-To-Farm
Statutes, NAT’L AGRIC. L. CTR.,
https://perma.cc/D4SJ-FA9B (last updated April 15, 2022).
221. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 2-4-101 (West 2021) (establishing a policy
to “conserve, protect, and encourage the development and improvement of
[Arkansas’s] agricultural [lands] . . . for the production of food, fiber, and other
agricultural . . . products”); COLO. REV. STAT. § 35-3.5-101 (2021) (establishing
a policy to “conserve, protect, and encourage the development and
improvement of [Colorado’s] agricultural land for the production of food and
other agricultural products”).
222. See Right-to-Farm: Typical Provisions, NAT’L AGRIC. L. CTR.,
https://perma.cc/2SJR-LQB4 (organizing the “different content in the specific
details of [each state’s] laws” into provisions, including a “Triggering Event,”
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accepted agricultural practices should not, as a matter of policy,
be considered public or private nuisances.223 While
agriculturalists champion these laws as protections for farmers
from “individuals who move into a rural area where normal
farming operations exist, and who later use nuisance actions to
attempt to stop these ongoing operations,”224 in some states,
these laws make it almost impossible to file nuisance suits
against farmers.225
While statutes differ, there are generally two buckets that
Right-to-Farm laws can be placed into.226 The first bucket
contains Right-to-Farm laws that grant nuisance immunity to
farming operations “which have been in existence for a given
period of time.”227 For example, Alabama’s Right-to-Farm Act
protects all “agricultural [or] farming operation facilit[ies that]
ha[ve] been in operation for more than one year.”228 These
restrictions act as a sort of statute of limitations and are enacted
to “prevent new neighbors from moving into an agricultural area
and then suing because the neighboring farming operation
cause[s] an annoyance.”229 The second bucket of Right-to-Farm
laws has no temporal limitation and thus creates “absolute
“Change in the Operation,” and “Limitations on Protections”) (last updated
Jan. 2020).
223. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 3482.5 (2021) (protecting agricultural
activities operated “in a manner consistent with proper and accepted customs
and standards”); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 19a-341 (2021) (making nuisance suits
non-actionable against agricultural facilities that conform to “acceptable
management practices”).
224. States’ Right-To-Farm Statutes, supra note 220.
225. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 106-700–702 (2021) (prohibiting plaintiffs
from filing a suit unless they own “real property” within a “half-mile of the
source of activity or structure” and setting a statute of limitations “within one
year of the establishment of the agricultural . . . operation or within one year
of the operation undergoing a fundamental change”). The 2013 amendments
to North Carolina’s Right-to-Farm law substantially narrowed what
constitutes as a “fundamental change.” Cordon M. Smart, The “Right to
Commit Nuisance” in North Carolina: A Historical Analysis of the
Right-to-Farm Act, 94 N.C. L. REV. 2097, 2130–32 (2016) (“Considering these
modifications to the statute, it remains unclear what, if anything, would
constitute a fundamental change to preclude the applicability of the nuisance
defense.”).
226. See KELLETT, supra note 202, at 2.
227. Id.
228. ALA. CODE § 6-5-127 (2021).
229. KELLETT, supra note 202, at 2.
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immunity for the farming operation[s].”230 For example, Iowa’s
Right-to-Farm statute states that “[a] farm or farm operation
located in an agricultural area shall not be found to be a
nuisance regardless of the established date of operation.”231
While bucket one gives neighbors faced with a nuisance a short
amount of time to file suit, bucket two makes it almost
impossible to file suit at any time.232
In addition to temporal restrictions, Right-to-Farm laws
often restrict plaintiffs from filing suit if the farming operation
is in compliance with either zoning laws, environmental laws, or
some other standard of conduct.233 One common standard of
compliance is with accepted agricultural customs.234 For
example, in Hawaii, “[n]o court . . . shall declare any farming
operation a nuisance for any reason if the farming operation has
been conducted in a manner consistent with generally accepted
In
Florida,
“[n]o
farm
agricultural
practices.”235
operation . . . shall be a public or private nuisance if the farm
operation conforms to generally accepted agricultural and
management practices.”236 While some statutes create
exemptions for especially egregious waste disposal issues that
occur
even
when
farms
employ
“generally
accepted . . . practices,”237 others do not.238 For many, the
purpose of the statute is to actually promote the use of generally
accepted practices.239 While that may seem reasonable, as

230. Id. at 3.
231. IOWA CODE § 352.11(1)(a) (2021).
232. See KELLETT, supra note 202, at 3.
233. See id.
234. See infra notes 238–239 and accompanying text.
235. HAW. REV. STAT. § 165-4 (2022).
236. FLA. STAT. § 823.14(4)(a) (2022). However, Florida’s Right-to-Farm
law contains several exceptions which would constitute a nuisance, including
“[t]he presence of untreated or improperly treated . . . dead animals,
dangerous waste materials, or gases which are harmful to human or animal
life.” Id.
237. See supra note 236 and accompanying text.
238. See supra note 235 and accompanying text; see also CONN. GEN. STAT.
§ 19A-341 (stating that an agricultural or farming operation is not a nuisance
“provided . . . such operation follows generally accepted agricultural
practices”).
239. See, e.g., IOWA CODE § 657.11A(1)(C) (2021) (“The general
assembly . . . declares its intent to preserve and enhance responsible animal
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discussed previously, many generally accepted agricultural
practices pose significant risks to human health and the
environment.240
For example, pursuant to Michigan’s Right to Farm Act,241
the Michigan Commission of Agriculture and Rural
Development was tasked with adopting Generally Accepted
Agricultural and Management Practices (“GAAMPs”).242
Michigan has adopted GAAMPs in multiple practices relevant
to farm-animal waste disposal, including Care of Farm Animals,
Irrigation Water Use, and Manure Management and
Utilization.243 Any farm that adheres to GAAMPs guidelines is
fully protected from nuisance liability, provided that the farm is
also abiding by state and federal environmental and
agricultural laws.244 The GAAMPs guidelines for Manure
Management and Utilization are almost identical to common
practices discussed earlier.245 For example, the guidelines
suggest that “[r]unoff control can be achieved by providing
facilities the option to collect and store the runoff for later
application to cropland.”246 After storage, the GAAMPs suggest
land application “when the soil is dry enough to accept the
water,” and recommends “[s]prinkler irrigation methods . . . [to]
provide uniform application of liquid with minimum labor
requirements.”247 The Michigan Commission of Agricultural and
Rural Development proffers that the standards are “based on

agricultural production, specifically animal agricultural producers in this
state who use existing prudent and generally utilized management practices
reasonable for their animal feeding operations.”).
240. See supra Part I.C.
241. Right to Farm Act, Mich. Comp. Laws §§ 286.471–286.474 (2022).
242. See Generally Accepted Agricultural and Management Practices
(GAAMPs), MICH. DEP’T OF AGRIC. & RURAL DEV., https://perma.cc/HT4DNZZF.
243. See id.
244. Id.; see also MICH. COMM. OF AGRIC. & RURAL DEV., GENERALLY
ACCEPTED AGRICULTURAL AND MANAGEMENT PRACTICES FOR MANURE
MANAGEMENT AND UTILIZATION 1 (2022) [hereinafter GAAMPS MANURE
MANAGEMENT], https://perma.cc/29XT-7NCX (PDF).
245. See supra Part I.B.
246. GAAMPS MANURE MANAGEMENT, supra note 244, at 2–3; see also
supra notes 28–29 and accompanying text.
247. GAAMPS MANURE MANAGEMENT, supra note 244, at 3; see also supra
notes 30–32 and accompanying text.
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sound science” and designed to “be[] protective of the
environment.”248 But considering that sound science has
established that these very practices are in fact harmful to the
environment and public health, Michigan’s environmental
justification is merely pretext.249 Instead, the accepted practices
are geared directly toward Michigan’s other stated purpose: to
allow “[a]nimal agriculture in Michigan [to] have the flexibility
and opportunity to change agricultural enterprises and adopt
new technology to remain economically viable and competitive
in the market place.”250
Other Right-to-Farm statutes allow a plaintiff to bring suit
only if there has been a substantial change in operation. For
example, the Alaska Right-to-Farm law states that “[a]n
agricultural facility . . . is not and does not become a private
nuisance as a result of a changed condition that exists in the
area of the agricultural facility if the agricultural facility was
not a nuisance at the time [it] began agricultural operations.”251
In comparison, the North Carolina statute requires a
“fundamental change” in operation as a condition for an
agricultural operation to qualify as a nuisance.252 But, under
this statute, a “fundamental change” does not include “[a]
change in ownership or size,” “[a]n interruption of farming for a
period of no more than three years,” “[p]articipation in a
government-sponsored agricultural program,” “[e]mployment of
new technology,” or “[a] change in the type of
agricultural . . . product produced.”253 The exclusion is so

248. GAAMPS MANURE MANAGEMENT, supra note 244, at iii, 8.
249. See supra Part I.C. In fact, Michigan’s Right to Farm Act specifically
acknowledges that “[g]enerally accepted agricultural and management
practices . . . may generate usual and ordinary noise, dust, odors, and other
associated conditions, and these practices are protected by the Michigan right
to farm act.” MICH. COMP. LAWS § 286.473c (2022).
250. GAAMPS MANURE MANAGEMENT, supra note 244, at 1.
251. ALASKA STAT. § 09.45.235(a) (2021).
252. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 106-701(a)(3) (2022) (only allowing suit if “[t]he
action is filed within one year of the establishment of the
agricultural . . . operation or within one year of the operation undergoing a
fundamental change”). The statute also requires that the plaintiff be a “legal
possessor of the real property” affected by the alleged nuisance and the real
property must be “located within one half-mile of the source of the activity or
structure alleged to be a nuisance.” Id. §§ 106-701(a)(1)–(2).
253. Id. § 106-701(a)(1).
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expansive, it is hard to image what would qualify as a
“fundamental change.”
While not much is clear about these statutes, the state
legislatures clearly intend to protect farming operations at all
costs. For example, North Carolina’s “Legislative determination
and declaration of policy” states,
It is the declared policy of the State to conserve and protect
and encourage the development and improvement of its
agricultural land . . . for the production of food, fiber, and
other products. When other land uses extend into
agricultural . . . areas, agricultural . . . operations often
become the subject of nuisance suits. As a result,
agricultural . . . operations are sometimes forced to cease.
Many others are discouraged from making investments in
farm . . . improvements. It is the purpose of this Article to
reduce the loss to the State of its agricultural . . . resources
by limiting the circumstances under which an
agricultural . . . operation may be deemed to be a
nuisance.254

There is nothing inherently wrong with valuing agriculture as
an economic commodity and protecting its economic value as
paramount. In fact, it is tantamount to American culture—we
view agriculture, and the right to farm, as a means to achieve
the “American dream.”255 Protecting agricultural activities has
obvious positive societal benefits, like boosting local and
national economy and promoting food security.256 Thus, the
problem is not that these acts exist,257 but rather that these acts,
254. Id. § 106-700.
255. See, e.g., Stephanie Metzinger, Agriculture Provides Gateway to
Achieve American Dream, W. GROWERS (Nov. 2, 2019), https://perma.cc/N9YSV3W6 (“The American Dream, the idea that anyone, regardless of social class
or location of birth, can attain prosperity through perseverance and hard
work, . . . is achievable largely through the opportunities offered by America’s
employers, in particular, the agriculture industry.”).
256. See Global Food Security, NAT’L INST. OF FOOD & AGRIC.,
https://perma.cc/VE47-RJE2 (“Secure access to food can produce wide ranging
positive impacts, including: Economic growth and job creation[, p]overty
reduction[, and i]mproved health and healthcare.”).
257. Some argue that Right-to-Farm laws are the primary cause of
negative environmental impacts caused by farming practices because the acts
minimize transaction costs for large CAFOs, which generate far more manure
than small farms could generate alone. See Shi-Ling Hsu, Scale Economies,
Scale Externalities: Hog Farming and the Changing American Agricultural
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in conjunction with loose federal environmental regulations,
make it practically impossible to protect against negative health
and environmental impacts arising from activities that are
considered normal farming practices.
C.

Success Despite all Odds: McKiver v. Murphy-Brown

While Right-to-Farm laws restrict the number of nuisance
suits that can be filed against agricultural facilities, they have
not completely barred these suits. McKiver v. Murphy-Brown258
is one of the largest of these cases, in terms of number of
plaintiffs and size of payout, to stand in the face of
Right-to-Farm laws.259 In 2013, a group of over five hundred
plaintiffs, comprising twenty-six cases, sought monetary
damages for nuisance and negligence against a large swine farm
operation in eastern North Carolina.260 The cases alleged that
Murphy-Brown, an industrial farming operator, operated
Kinlaw Farms, a large hog farm in eastern North Carolina, and
engaged in farming practices that constituted an ongoing
nuisance.261 Kinlaw Farms maintained about 15,000 hogs,
which produced “approximately 153,000 pounds of feces and
urine daily.”262 To dispose of the hog waste, the Farms used a
“lagoon-and-sprayfield method.”263 Kinlaw Farms had three
lagoons that “contained millions of gallons of hog waste.”264 As
lagoons were filled, the Farms “periodically drained [the]

Industry, 94 OR. L. REV. 23, 40 (2015) (“RTF laws do not actually protect
farms, . . . [but instead] are an implicit subsidy for large CAFOs and, as such,
are an assault on small farms.”). This Note does not promote the idea that
Right-to-Farm acts are broadly without fault. It only suggests that the most
effective solution is to fix federal regulatory and statutory gaps that allow the
agricultural pollution issues caused by large CAFOs to occur in the first place.
258. 980 F.3d 937 (4th Cir. 2020).
259. See id. at 946 (affirming the district court’s finding of liability against
a hog production facility but remanding to reduce the amount of punitive
damages originally awarded [more than $50 million]).
260. In re NC Swine Farm Nuisance Litig., No. 5:15-CV-00013-BR, 2017
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 185089, at *13 (E.D.N.C. Nov. 8, 2017).
261. McKiver, 980 F.3d at 946.
262. Id. at 947.
263. Id.; see also supra Part I.B.
264. McKiver, 980 F.3d at 947.
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waste . . . and spread it across open ‘sprayfields.’”265
“Approximately eight million gallons of hog feces were sprayed
in the air annually.”266 Additionally, the Farms used fans and
vents to move fumes from the hog shed to the outside of the
building and stored hog carcasses in “dumpsters placed in open
fields,” which attracted “dozens of buzzards and flies.”267 On top
of more general nuisances, including “odor, flies, noise, trucks,
[and] interference with [plaintiffs’] quality of life,” plaintiffs
feared health effects, including “upper respiratory and
gastrointestinal ailments.”268
At the trial court, Murphy-Brown raised an affirmative
defense pursuant to North Carolina’s Right-to-Farm law.269 At
the
time,
the
law
protected
“existing
farming
operations . . .when
other
land
uses
extend
into
agricultural . . . areas . . . by limiting the circumstances under
which an agricultural . . . operation may be deemed to be a
nuisance.”270 The relevant section of the statute stated:
No agricultural or forestry operation . . . shall be or become
a nuisance . . . by any changed conditions in or about the
locality outside of the operation after the operation has been
in operation for more than one year, when such operation
was not a nuisance at the time the operation began.271

Murphy-Brown argued that conditions around the area had
“changed since the farms began operating.”272 Specifically, it
referred to an increase in the number of people living nearby,
and argued that the affirmative defense was applicable.273 The
court disagreed based on evidence presented by the plaintiffs:
“that they or their relatives ha[d] lived on the affected properties
prior to the subject swine farms beginning operations.”274 The
265. Id.
266. Id.
267. Id.
268. Id.
269. In re NC Swine Farm Nuisance Litig., 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 185089,
at *24.
270. Id. at *25.
271. Id. (emphasis added).
272. Id.
273. Id. (emphasis added).
274. Id. at *25–26. The court relied on Mayes v. Tabor, 334 S.E.2d 489, 491
(N.C. Ct. App. 1985), where the court found that the Right-to-Farm affirmative
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court definitively stated that “for the right-to-farm to apply, it
must be on account of changed conditions in the locality outside
the agricultural operation.”275 Because the plaintiffs’ land use
“had been in existence well before the operations of the subject
farms began” and their “[specific] nuisance claims ha[d] nothing
to do with changed conditions in the area,” the court held that
the defendant’s affirmative Right-to-Farm defense was barred
as a matter of law.276 Accordingly, and upon hearing evidence of
the plaintiff’s harms, the jury returned a verdict in favor of the
plaintiffs and awarded “$75,000 in compensatory damages per
plaintiff, along with a total of $5 million in punitive damages.”277
In response to this ruling, the North Carolina legislature
swiftly amended its Right-to-Farm law, prompting
Murphy-Brown’s motion to alter or amend summary judgment
and eventual appeal to the Fourth Circuit.278 The legislature
specifically stated that “recently a federal trial court incorrectly
and narrowly interpreted the North Carolina Right to Farm Act
in a way that contradicts the intent of the General Assembly and
effectively renders the Act toothless in offering meaningful
protection to long-established North Carolina farms.”279 At the
Fourth Circuit, the court affirmed that these amendments were

defense did not apply to the defendant because the plaintiffs had owned their
land longer than defendants and conditions outside of the agricultural
operations had not changed. Id. at 490–91.
275. In re NC Swine Farm Nuisance Litig., No. 5:15-CV-00013-BR, 2017
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 185089, at *26 (E.D.N.C. Nov. 8, 2017).
276. Id. at *27.
277. See McKiver v. Murphy-Brown, LLC, 980 F.3d 937, 946 (4th Cir.
2020) (reducing punitive damages “to $2.5 million due to North Carolina’s
punitive damages cap”).
278. See McKiver v. Murphy-Brown, LLC, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 211807,
at *3–4 (E.D.N.C. Dec. 17, 2018) (“Defendant argues that based on post-trial
amendments to North Carolina’s Right to Farm Act, the Act bars plaintiffs’
recovery of punitive damages.”).
279. 2018 N.C. Sess. Laws 113. The Act went into effect so that, now,
[n]o
nuisance
action
may
be
filed
against
an
agricultural . . . operation . . . unless . . . the plaintiff is a legal
possessor of the real property affected, . . . [t]he real property . . . is
located within one half-mile of . . . the activity, . . . [and t]he action
is filed within one year of the establishment of the
agricultural . . . operation or within one year of the operation
undergoing a fundamental change.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 106-701(a) (emphasis added).
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only prospective and did not apply to the current litigation.280
But, if the case had been brought after the 2018 amendment, it
would almost certainly have been barred.281
Although many championed this outcome as a “historic
victory,”282 agriculturalists saw the award as an attack on
agriculture generally.283 Many legislatures sided with the
agriculturalists.
D.

The Battle in State Legislatures

While McKiver may be a glimmer of hope for communities
neighboring farming operations,284 state legislatures have taken
the opportunity to “fight back” and protect their farmers.285 In
the wake of this litigation, states other than North Carolina
280. See McKiver, 980 F.3d at 955 (noting that “the 2017 RTFA
amendment expressly states it will apply to causes of action going forward”
(emphasis added)).
281. See, e.g., Lewis v. Murphy-Brown, LLC, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 44997,
at *4 (E.D.N.C. Mar. 16, 2020) (ordering summary judgment for
Murphy-Brown because “defendant’s removal of its swine from the Kinlaw
Farm operation” did not qualify as a fundamental change contemplated by the
statute and the Kinlaw Farm operation was established in 1995, “which is well
over one year after the establishment of the subject operation”). Notably, this
was the exact farming operation implicated in McKiver and Lewis was alleging
similar injuries as the McKiver plaintiffs had alleged—the only difference
between McKiver and Lewis was the statutory language applied. See also Kill
Tovar, North Carolina’s New Right to Farm Law Bars Nuisance Claim, IOWA
ST. UNIV. CTR. FOR AGRIC. & TAX’N (Mar. 17, 2020), https://perma.cc/M2D9Q2HY (discussing Lewis).
282. See McKiver v. Murphy-Brown, PUB. JUST. FOOD PROJECT,
https://perma.cc/HW9G-DWV8 (“Hundreds of mostly Black and brown
community members in Eastern North Carolina won a series of mass action
lawsuits against Smithfield.”).
283. See, e.g., Lisa Sorg, Jury Awards Plaintiffs More than 50 Million in
Historic Hog Nuisance Lawsuit, NC POL’Y WATCH (April 26, 2018),
https://perma.cc/49VU-MSMD (describing the suit as an “outrageous attack on
animal agriculture” and “a serious threat to a major industry, [the] economy
and the jobs and livelihoods of tens of thousands of North Carolinians”).
284. See, e.g., Christina Cooke, Iowa Residents to Sue the State Over Air
Emissions from Industrial Hog Farms, CIV. EATS (May 16, 2018),
https://perma.cc/L7X5-SQNA (“The Iowa lawsuit comes on the heels of a
landmark verdict in the first twenty-six nuisance cases filed by 500 Eastern
North Carolina residents against Murphy-Brown LLC.”).
285. See, e.g., Smart, supra note 225, at 2129 (“A comparison of the
legislative history and the timeline of the litigation strongly suggests that the
proposed amendments were modified to apply to the developing litigation.”).
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have also amended their Right-to-Farm laws,286 Farm Acts,287
and constitutions288 to provide broader protection to farmers.
North Carolina first amended its Right-to-Farm statute in
2013, mere weeks after the initiation of the flurry of nuisance
cases against Murphy-Brown.289 As discussed above, it
continued to amend its law in response to McKiver.290 Arizona
followed suit in 2021 and amended its Right-to-Farm law to
provide cost-shifting provisions, penalties for bad-faith filing,
and a bar against awarding punitive damages to plaintiffs
unless “the alleged nuisance emanated from an agricultural
operation that has been subject to a criminal conviction or a civil
enforcement action.”291
The Georgia legislature similarly fought to amend its
Right-to-Farm law in the wake of McKiver, but the bill failed to
pass.292 Led and lobbied by the Georgia Farm Bureau, the bill
was controversial from the start.293 In form and policy, it
“mimicked
[the]
2018
North
Carolina
law.”294
Environmentalists strongly opposed the bill, arguing that it
286. See Chelsea McGuire, More Than a Nuisance: Why Strengthening
Right-to-Farm Laws Became a Key Legislative Priority, ARIZ. FARM BUREAU
(Apr. 16, 2021), https://perma.cc/4R7R-4WGR (“Since the 2018 verdicts in
North Carolina, Arizona ag policy leaders have been looking for opportunities
to strengthen our Right to Farm statute, in anticipation that these kinds of
lawsuits are not going away.”).
287. For example, North Carolina amended its Farm Act in 2019 providing
further protection to farmers from nuisance suits. See Hog Waste and the Farm
Act of 2019, N.C. LEAGUE OF CONSERVATION VOTERS, https://perma.cc/DLX536A5 (arguing that the 2019 Farm Bill, which added a section making formerly
public documents confidential and another section allowing for permits to
modify waste operations, was enacted to “prop up Smithfield foods”).
288. See, e.g., N.D. CONST. art. XI, § 29 (“The right of farmers and ranchers
to engage in modern farming and ranching practices shall be forever
guaranteed in this state.”).
289. Smart, supra note 225, at 2101.
290. See supra Part III.C.
291. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 3-112(C) (2021); see also 2021 Ariz. Sess. Laws
1448.
292. See Jessica Szilagyi, Ga Legislature Fails to Give Final Passage to Ag
Nuisance/‘Right to Farm’ Bill, ALLONGEORGIA (July 1, 2020),
https://perma.cc/Q3AT-EXRJ.
293. See id. (noting that the Bureau released a “strong digital ad
campaign,” rousing small property owners and environmentalists in
opposition).
294. Id.
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“flip[ped] the current law on its head . . . [by] prevent[ing]
existing land owners from protecting their property values from
new and expanding agricultural operations that mov[ed] into
their neighborhoods.”295 They argued that this would be in direct
conflict with the law’s current policy to protect farmers “[w]hen
nonagricultural land uses extend into agricultural or
agricultural-supporting industrial or commercial areas.”296 The
environmentalists and landowners ultimately prevailed, but the
contentious political fight suggests that legislators backed by
the Georgia agriculture industry may continue to fight for an
amendment.297
A few legislatures have gone a step farther and amended
their constitutions to include the right to farm. In 2012, for
example, North Dakota added a Right-to-Farm provision to its
state constitution, forever guaranteeing “[t]he right of farmers
and ranchers to engage in modern farming and ranching
practices . . . in this state.”298 Missouri passed a similar
amendment to its constitution in 2014,299 and Oklahoma tried,
but ultimately failed, to add the right to farm to its constitution
in 2016.300
For better or worse, state Right-to-Farm protections appear
anchored into the American legal system. Regardless, repealing
Right-to-Farm laws or leaving the regulatory work up to the
states has not successfully protected vulnerable communities
from the negative impacts of agricultural waste.301 Instead, the
federal government must combat the dangerous environmental
impacts of agricultural waste on a sweeping scale. A renewed
federal initiative is necessary.

295. Id.
296. GA. CODE ANN. § 41-1-7 (2021).
297. See Szilagyi, supra note 292 (suggesting that the bill failed to pass
primarily because “lawmakers could not negotiate the measure to a point of
consensus” by the end of the 2019–2020 legislative session).
298. N.D. CONST. art. XI, § 29.
299. MO. CONST. art. I, § 35 (“[T]he right of farmers and ranchers to engage
in farming and ranching practices shall be forever guaranteed in this state.”).
300. See Oklahoma Right to Farm Amendment, State Question 777 (2016),
BALLOTPEDIA, https://perma.cc/6XZ4-AHPE.
301. See supra Part I.D.
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IV. THE SOLUTION: STRONGER FEDERAL ENVIRONMENTAL
ACTION
Agricultural waste is a comprehensive problem that can
only be remedied with a comprehensive solution. Below are two
primary solutions: (i) amend the CWA to more aptly cover farms
that house less than 1,000 animal units in concentrated
facilities as “point sources;”302 and (ii) amend RCRA to designate
big-issue wastes, starting with agricultural wastes, as
hazardous.303 If the CWA or RCRA regulated agricultural waste,
the EPA could also regulate it under CERCLA.304 This would
further impose liability upon agricultural facilities that
improperly dispose of waste.305
Because of the highly politicized nature of state farming
legislation, the issue of agricultural waste disposal can only be
fixed with stronger federal legislation, as opposed to state
regulation or some restriction on state Right-to-Farm laws.
Amending these statutes to address the problem more
adequately would be the best solution because the policy behind
each statute provides a compelling foundation for the proposed
amendments.306 It would appear less drastic than an entirely
new federal statute, making it more palatable to the public and
the federal legislature. While some of the same political concerns
would arise in the federal legislature, an amendment could be
worded to mitigate economic concern by setting jurisdictional
limits within the bounds of federalism and by targeting only the
facilities that cause more than a de minimis environmental
impact. Finally, the political agendas of different states could
create a majority in Congress that is more willing to expand
environmental protections than legislators may be on a
state-by-state basis.
On both a state and federal level, powerful lobbyists back
Right-to-Farm laws and other agricultural legislation, and the
fight for or against stronger agricultural legislation often splits

302. See supra notes 162–165 and accompanying text.
303. See supra notes 137–139 and accompanying text.
304. See supra note 136 and accompanying text.
305. See supra Part II.A.1.
306. See supra note 127 and accompanying text (explaining RCRA policy);
infra notes 323–324 and accompanying text (explaining CWA policy).
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along party lines.307 Lobbyist backing for agricultural initiatives
predominates across both parties, but Republicans historically
attract almost two times the amount of funding from
agribusiness political action committees (PACs) than their
Democratic counterparts.308 In terms of agricultural political
contributors, Democratic contributors generally back stronger
regulatory action, while Republicans are more partial to
de-regulatory action.309 Once environmental legislation is in
place, agency regulation follows a similar trajectory and sways
from regulatory to de-regulatory action depending on the
political affiliation of the current administration.310 While it
may be “impossible to stop the swing of regulation and
deregulation,” Congress has the ability to step in and make
larger policy decisions by either passing more specific legislation
or amending current legislation to take a final stance on
vacillating regulation.311
While this political tension is also prevalent in federal
agricultural legislation, leaving this large of an issue to
oscillating regulatory action or to state regulation has led to
inadequate protection of human health and the environment.312
To fix the gaps in our current federal environmental laws,
Congress must act.
307. See, e.g., Szilagyi, supra note 292 (discussing Georgia’s failed
Right-to-Farm bill).
308. In 2021, agribusiness PACs contributed $2,253,938 to Democrats and
$4,036,974 to Republicans. See Agribusiness PACs Contributions to
Candidates, 2021–2022, OPEN SECRETS: FOLLOWING THE MONEY IN POL.,
https://perma.cc/L9DH-ECKK.
309. See, e.g., Policy: Issues Important to America’s Cattlemen and Women,
NAT’L CATTLEMEN’S BEEF ASS’N, https://perma.cc/ZD5U-3D4M (arguing that
the Endangered Species Act should be amended to support “flexibility . . . to
make responsible management decisions for their land”).
310. See Rachel Augustine Potter, Democratic Presidents Regulate.
Republican Presidents Deregulate. Congress Could Stop the Pendulum Swing.,
WASH. POST (Oct. 14, 2021, 5:00 AM), https://perma.cc/9EZU-4T59 (describing
the “pendulum” of regulatory action through the lens of Clean Water Act
jurisdictional arguments). This article argues that “[t]his back-and-forth”
wastes government resources, demoralizes agency officials, and makes it more
difficult for agencies to make long-term plans. Id. Political lobbyists also back
these regulatory actions. See Policy: Issues Important to America’s Cattlemen
and Women, supra note 309 (supporting an EPA rule that exempts “cattle
producers from EPCRA reporting”).
311. Potter, supra note 310.
312. See supra Part II.B.
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A.

The Straightforward CWA Solution

As discussed above, agricultural waste negatively impacts
clean water because the CWA fails to classify most large
industrial farms as “point sources.”313 Strictly speaking,
however, the statutory language of the CWA does classify a
“concentrated animal feeding operation” as a point source.314
This signifies that Congress intended to regulate large-scale
agricultural waste, but that at some point the problem got out
of hand. Specifically, this issue grew as EPA regulations
intending to further clarify the language “concentrated animal
feeding operation” allowed many large farms to escape
regulation altogether.315 Generally, when Congress leaves gaps
in legislation, courts presume that it intended the gaps to be
filled by the agency granted congressional authority to execute
the statute316—in this case, the EPA.317 There are methods in
place for the people and courts to monitor agency action,318 but
generally agencies have significant power to define ambiguous
statutory language and determine how it should be carried
out.319 Once agencies fill statutory gaps, so long as the agency’s
interpretation is “reasonable,” it will stand.320 Alternatively, the
definition may change as administrations change and political
incentives drive agency officials to regulate or deregulate.321 But
the agency does not have the last word—Congress does.322 If
Congress believes that an agency has made a policy decision
that is unwise in the context of the greater statutory scheme, it
can amend the statute. That is exactly what Congress should do.

313.
314.
315.
316.
317.
318.

See infra Part II.A.2.
See 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14).
See notes 160–166 and accompanying text.
See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843–44 (1984).
33 U.S.C. § 1251(d).
See JARED P. COLE, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R44699, AN INTRODUCTION TO
JUDICIAL REVIEW OF FEDERAL AGENCY ACTION 1–2 (discussing judicial review of
agency actions under the Administrative Procedure Act).
319. Id. at 1.
320. Id. at 13.
321. See Potter, supra note 310 (“It is probably impossible to stop the swing
of regulation and deregulation.”).
322. See id. (“[I]f Congress wanted to, it could slow down the pendulum by
making more of the big policy calls itself.”).
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By narrowly defining “concentrated animal feeding
operation,” the EPA has subverted the purpose of the Clean
Water Act. In 1972, when Congress enacted the CWA, it
declared a policy to restore and maintain the “chemical,
physical, and biological integrity of [the] Nation’s waters.”323 At
that time, Congress set lofty goals, including “that the discharge
of pollutants into the navigable waters be eliminated by 1985,”
“that the discharge of toxic pollutants in toxic amounts be
prohibited,” and “that areawide waste treatment management
planning processes be developed and implemented to assure
adequate control of sources of pollutants in each State.”324
Although water quality has improved,325 polluting activities
classified as nonpoint sources still stand in the way of hitting
these statutory goals.326 One way that Congress can ensure a
move in the right direction is to statutorily clarify what qualifies
as a “concentrated animal feeding operation.”327
While the EPA currently defines a CAFO by the number of
animal units that are confined on any one farm, there are other
definitions that would be more comprehensive and sustainable.
Congress should adopt a definition that considers the ratio of
animals to land forages. This is a method used in sustainable
farming to determine how much livestock a farmer should
obtain depending on the type and size of the land they own.328
For example, the Natural Resources Conservation Service
(NRCS) suggests that, as a rule of thumb, “it takes 1.5 to 2 acres

323. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a); see also Reynolds Metal Co. v. EPA, 760 F.2d 549,
557 (4th Cir. 1985) (“The Act expresses a congressional insistence to eliminate
water pollution within a short time-span.”).
324. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a).
325. See Andreen, supra note 159, at 26 (“Both municipal and industrial
discharges have declined sharply, the loss of wetlands has been cut decisively,
and water quality has broadly improved across the country.”).
326. See id. at 27 (suggesting that the CWA is in need of some
“fine-tuning . . . to finish the task that began in 1972,” with a specific focus on
pollution from nonpoint sources).
327. See 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14) (listing “concentrated animal feeding
operation” as a “point source” but leaving a gap open for the EPA to further
define it); see also notes 162–166 and accompanying text.
328. See NAT. RES. CONSERVATION SERV., BALANCING YOUR ANIMALS WITH
YOUR FORAGE: SMALL SCALE SOLUTIONS FOR YOUR FARM 1 (2009),
https://perma.cc/27UX-VJNZ (PDF).
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to feed a cow calf pair for 12 months.”329 This means that a farm
with about twenty acres of pasture would sustainably be able to
house and feed about ten to thirteen cows.330 Any farmer who
wants to own more livestock than could sustainably forage her
land would be subject to the CWA permitting scheme. Because
almost all industrial feeding operations house livestock in
“high-density, confined spaces,” they would be subject to CWA
permitting.331 This would incentivize industrial farmers to
invest in sustainable practices or be subjected to regulation. It
would also shield smaller farms and farms already using
sustainable farming practices from unnecessary regulation.
Some may argue that expanding the CWA in this way would
upset the balance of cooperative federalism implicit in the
Act332—but this is not the case. Cooperative federalism is
defined as a mode of government “in which the state
governments, local governments, and the federal government
share responsibility” in creating and implementing a particular
area of law or policy.333 While Congress left statutory gaps for
the EPA to fill, it also left gaps for states to fill based on
jurisdictional limits.334 The federal government regulates “point
sources,” and the states regulate “nonpoint sources.”335
This division of responsibility reflects a legislative
understanding that “nationwide uniformity in controlling
non-point source pollution [is] virtually impossible,” as well
as that “the control of non-point source pollution often
depends on land use controls, which are traditionally state
or local in nature.” Put another way, the Act’s election not to
regulate all sources of pollution—or for that matter all
waters of the nation—is rooted in the traditional
329. Id.
330. Id. The NRCS’s calculations account for more than the size of land
and the amount of cattle. Other factors include the length of the grazing
season, the average weight of one of the animals, the average yield of the
pasture per acre, and the daily utilization rate for livestock. Id.
331. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
332. See, e.g., Damien Schiff, Keeping the Clean Water Act Cooperatively
Federal—Or, Why the Clean Water Act Does Not Directly Regulate
Groundwater Pollution, 42 WM. & MARY ENV’T L. & POL’Y REV. 447, 448 (2018).
333. Cooperative Federalism Law and Legal Definition, USLEGAL,
https://perma.cc/D6QX-D8N8.
334. See Schiff, supra note 332, at 449.
335. See supra notes 166–170 and accompanying text.
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congressional “reluctance . . . to allow extensive federal
intrusion into areas of regulation that might implicate land
and water uses in individual states.”336

Thus, the purpose behind cooperative federalism in the CWA
was to let states address local water- and land-use problems
through a local lens. But the business of agriculture is no longer
localized.337 In the context of industrial farming, an
overwhelming number of farms are managed in the same ways,
including their waste disposal mechanisms.338 To better meet
the clean water needs of the country, these farms should be
widely federally regulated under the CWA.
B.

Getting Around RCRA’s Legislative History

While protecting the waters of the United States from
agricultural waste under the CWA would require a relatively
straightforward amendment to the Act’s substantive text,
regulating agricultural waste under RCRA poses a larger
obstacle. The only feasible option to effectively cover
agricultural waste under RCRA is for Congress to amend the
statute to specifically designate “agricultural waste” as
“hazardous.” This would allow the EPA to track agricultural
waste before it reaches a waterway or is discharged into the air
in a way that negatively effects the natural environment and
public health.339 Notably, this amendment would clearly fall in
line with RCRA’s goal to “assur[e] that hazardous waste
management practices are conducted in a manner which
protects human health and the environment.”340
Currently, the leading obstacles to this solution are that
(i) the statute does not specifically define any “hazardous
waste[s],”341 and (ii) its legislative history suggests that the
enacting legislators did not intend for RCRA to apply to
agricultural facilities.342 Instead, the EPA designates solid

336.
337.
338.
339.
340.
341.
342.

Schiff, supra note 332, at 449.
See supra Part I.A.
See supra Part I.B.
See supra note 127 and accompanying text.
42 U.S.C. §§ 6902(a)(4).
Id. § 6903; see also supra notes 129–130 and accompanying text.
See infra note 352 and accompanying text.
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wastes as “hazardous” and thus determines which wastes RCRA
regulates.343 Pursuant to this authority, the EPA promulgated a
rule that exempts “solid wastes generated by . . . raising of
animals, including manures . . . [if they] are returned to the
soils as fertilizers.”344 As discussed previously, this exempts
substantially all agricultural waste from RCRA regulation.345
But this exemption was policy-based, not toxicity-based—as
noted by the EPA when promulgating the rule, “the legislative
history of RCRA . . . specifically calls for such an exclusion.”346
Under RCRA, the EPA has developed two primary routes
for determining what constitutes hazardous waste. Solid waste
is designated as hazardous if (i) it is “listed as a hazardous waste
in EPA’s regulations,” or (ii) it “exhibit[s] one of four hazardous
characteristics.”347 One method of listing hazardous wastes,
under route one, is if the waste comes “from specific sources.”348
Thus, the EPA could list wastes “from” industrial livestock
production or agricultural production as hazardous wastes
under this framework. Alternatively, the four hazardous
characteristics are (i) ignitability, (ii) corrosivity, (iii) reactivity,
and (iv) toxicity.349 “Toxicity” is defined as a solid waste that
leaches a listed contaminant at levels equal to or greater than
those defined as “toxic” by the EPA.350 Notably, listed
contaminants include arsenic, which is known to be a common
byproduct of food-animal waste, suggesting that the EPA could
343. See PERCIVAL ET AL., supra note 203, at 384 (“Although Congress
required EPA to regulate hazardous waste, . . . it did not specify how the
agency was to determine what wastes were hazardous.”).
344. 40 C.F.R. 261.4(b)(2) (2022); see also supra Part II.A.2.
345. See supra Part II.A.1.
346. Hazardous Waste Management System: Identification and Listing of
Hazardous Waste, 45 Fed. Reg. 33084, 33099 (May 19, 1980) (to be codified at
40 C.F.R. pt. 261); see generally H.R. REP. No. 94-1491 (1976).
347. PERCIVAL ET AL., supra note 203, at 384.
348. 40 C.F.R. § 261.32 (2022). Some examples of this designation include
wastes from “[i]norganic pigments,” “[o]rganic chemicals,” or “[i]norganic
chemicals.” Id.
349. PERCIVAL ET AL., supra note 203, at 385; see also 40 C.F.R. § 261.21
(2022) (defining ignitability); id. § 261.22 (defining corrosivity); id. § 261.23
(defining reactivity); id. § 261.24 (defining toxicity).
350. See id. § 261.24(a) (“A solid waste . . . exhibits the characteristic of
toxicity if . . . the extract from a representative sample of the waste contains
any of the contaminants [listed in the statute] at the concentration equal to or
greater than the respective value given.”).
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regulate agricultural waste under this method as well.351 But
the legislative history of the Act, which the EPA relied on when
promulgating the broad exemption for agricultural waste, states
that “agriculture wastes which are returned to the soil as
fertilizer or soil conditions are not considered discarded material
in the sense of this legislation.”352
There are a few ways to get around this problem without
resorting to legislative action. First, a few cases have
interpreted this exemption narrowly, suggesting that it only
applies if the agricultural waste is properly applied to the land
as fertilizer, not “appl[ied] in such large quantities that its
usefulness as organic fertilizer is eliminated.”353 The EPA could
adopt this logic via a policy or guidance document and then
enforce it against agricultural operations that overapply
manure as fertilizer.354 Alternatively, the EPA could repeal its
exemption, but this would likely be challenged widely by
agriculturalists. Because of the Chevron standard355 and
RCRA’s legislative history, the EPA may have a difficult time
defending the reasonableness of this action.356 As a final option,
Congress could amend the statute to explicitly give the EPA
authority to regulate agricultural waste as a solid, hazardous
waste under the statute. While there is currently no section
under RCRA that defines specific wastes that must be regulated
under the statute, it is well within Congress’s power to grant
this authority by amending the statute. Additionally, because of
351. See id.; see also supra note 67 and accompanying text.
352. Water Keeper All., Inc. v. Smithfield Foods, Inc., 2001 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 21314, at *12 (E.D.N.C. Sept. 20, 2001) (“Legislative history of the
RCRA clarified that ‘agriculture wastes which are returned to the soil as
fertilizer or soil conditions are not considered discarded material in the sense
of this legislation.’” (quoting H.R. REP. No. 94-1491 (1976), reprinted in 1976
U.S.C.C.A.N. 6238, 6240)); see also supra note 346 and accompanying text.
353. Water Keeper All., Inc, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21314, at *13; see also
Cmty. Ass’n for Restoration of the Env’t v. Cow Palace, LLC, 80 F. Supp. 3d.
1180, 1220 (E.D. Wash. 2015) (refusing to accept the defendants’ “blanket
interpretation that manure, used as a fertilizer, can never be considered a
‘solid waste’ under RCRA” (emphasis in original)).
354. See COLE, supra note 318, at 1.
355. See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–43 (1984).
356. See id. at 843–44. Although not specifically in the statute, legislative
history suggests congressional intent to exclude agriculture from RCRA
regulation, which would make it difficult for the EPA to argue that
agricultural waste regulation is reasonable under RCRA.

1594

79 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1541 (2022)

the drastic growth of industrialized agriculture since the
enactment of RCRA in 1976357 and the scientific evidence now
available to clarify the toxicity of animal-waste byproducts,358
Congress should explicitly regulate industrial, agricultural
waste under this statute.
C.

Backend Cleanup: Imposing CERCLA Liability

CERCLA regulates cleanup of hazardous waste and its
jurisdiction extends to substances regulated under both the
CWA and RCRA.359 Thus, if Congress were to amend the CWA
to impose permitting requirements on a wider range of CAFOs,
the EPA could impose cleanup liability on farming operations
that impermissibly discharge agricultural pollutants into the
waters of the United States. Similarly, if Congress were to
amend RCRA to explicitly cover agricultural wastes, CERCLA
liability could be broadly imposed on agricultural operations
that overapply manure as fertilizer even if dangerous
byproducts are not directly discharged into national waters.360
Additionally, CERCLA can be applied retroactively,361 which
could help communities surrounding agricultural facilities
reclaim the environmental purity of their land from pollution
that occurred prior to enactment. Again, the problem of
agricultural waste disposal is comprehensive and deserves a
comprehensive solution. While these legal solutions are only the
tip of the iceberg, amending these statutes and imposing
cleanup liability through CERCLA would be a big step toward a
necessary, comprehensive solution.
CONCLUSION
Agricultural waste is currently one of the most significant
threats to clean water and air in the United States. As the
357. See EPA History: Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, EPA,
https://perma.cc/8E5Q-4Z6C.
358. See supra Part I.C.
359. See supra note 136 and accompanying text.
360. While CERCLA provides an exemption from reporting “[n]ormal
application of fertilizers,” the overapplication of fertilizers covered by this
Note’s proposed RCRA amendment is not “normal.” See supra notes 153–154
and accompanying text.
361. See Superfund Liability, EPA, https://perma.cc/72CC-N3D8.
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industrial agricultural complex continues to grow, the negative
health and environmental impacts of agricultural waste will
only worsen. If nothing is done to change this trajectory,
industrial agriculture will continue to exploit the land and lives
of communities neighboring these concentrated facilities,
primarily communities of color and low-income communities.
Excessive animal consumption, the American need for meat,
and the considerable economic incentives driving food-animal
production have swept public health and environmental safety
under the regulatory rug. Now is the time to reconsider these
priorities. We must initiate a shift in the way we think about
the farm-to-plate pipeline by reinforcing a legal landscape that
incentivizes
sustainable
farming
and
disincentivizes
concentrated animal production.
This Note has demonstrated that federal laws purporting to
safely govern waste disposal practices fail to effectively regulate
agricultural waste and that state laws and regulations place
agricultural interests before environmental and public safety.
As a result, the major environmental statutes governing waste
disposal must be amended to address this public health crisis
and give the communities most intimately affected by it the
protection they deserve.

